Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them, or in one man. For, although mens free judgments are very diverse, each one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible to preserve peace, unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger, or hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his private authority.
For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to the judgment of the authorities (who, alone, have the right of making and repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen should; but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the people against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.
Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes, without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace; namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels, to be best.
Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness, nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the highest regard for duty, as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is exercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity; these could not be preserved if every man were to live as he pleased; therefore it is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country’s laws, for if the practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow.
...
From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that promises ought not to be kept, or that everyone should live as he pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than the law.
However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are yet propounded and published with unworthy motives. This question we have discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that reason should nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man’s loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions only — namely, from his charity towards his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever settled so wisely that no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated — vices as they are — because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered.--Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, chapter 20.
One of the peculiarities of Dutch political life is that with help of some public intellectuals and politicians, Spinoza has become the hero of Enlightenment freedom of expression. I used to think the motives for this were primarily antisemitic: to use a model second generation immigrant, a Jew -- usefully one exiled by his intolerant contemporaries ,-- to criticize Muslims (often second and third generation immigrants); if only Muslims had their own Enlightenment!* (I am, perhaps, rather too fond of teaching Al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd as predecessors of Spinoza.)
I don't mean to deny that there is also a sense in which Spinoza's arguments here prefigure a central and recognizable component of existing Dutch political culture: the firm acknowledgment that no human institution will be free from annoying byproducts (or externalities), but that attempts to rid the world of all those byproducts will both undermine the institution that's worth having as well as make matters worse. That is he teaches that even well formed states will have to tolerate a level of unruly inconvenience that are predictable fruits of their best features.
Now, I used to point out that Spinoza makes an uncomfortable hero of freedom of expression given that his view on the matter is so illiberal (from the perspective of, say, Mill's imperfect version):+ he leaves the ruling powers a lot of room in labeling some views as seditious, especially because he explicitly allows that the implications of some views can be grounds for the judgment. But in recent years, I have come to see this is one reason why Spinoza is so popular among otherwise rather conservative and status quo friendly thinkers. This becomes clear if we notice three consequences of his views.
For, while Spinoza allows some polite criticism of the rulers, the ruling power(s) may not be accused of injustice. This entails that (i) Spinoza's approach allows one to criticize the views of the powerless more than the powerful. In addition, (ii) Spinoza rules out all civil disobedience. In addition, even though Spinoza agrees with Machiavelli (and others) that expressions of anger are important epistemic signals about bad ruling and the malfunctioning of society's institutions, (iii) Spinoza is suspicious of public expressions of anger--these can be labeled irrational and (potentially) seditious. Here Spinoza makes a good target for those suspicious of Stoic aversion to anger (recall Srinivasian and Audre Lorde). For modern advocates of Spinoza's views these (i-iii) are not bugs, but welcome features because they facilitate an ideology in which critical minorities need to know their place.
But in re-reading Spinoza recently, I recognized his thought is more complex. He really has two doctrines: one for well-formed states and one for corrupt states. In neither one is allowed to accuse the government of injustice (so that remains illiberal). But strikingly in well-formed states there is much wider latitude for the public expression of anger and other vehement emotions. The reason for this is that here Spinoza treats the division between well-formed and corrupt state in terms of susceptibility to demagogues. In the corrupt state anti-intellectual demagogues are dangerously popular.
Spinoza's point is clear, I think. In well-formed states expressions of anger are a means toward starting the process of improving public policy by judicious politicians. By contrast, in states where demagogues can ride waves of anger and superstitious fear they really threaten to undermine the purpose of the polity which is to make all citizens feel secure and free. Spinoza here does justice to the insights of both the critics and advocates of the permissibly of anger in public life. The question is, then, if one grants the insight to a Spinozistic political philosopher, how one can recognize to what degree one's state is among the relatively healthy or relatively corrupt such that one can minimize the downside risks of getting it wrong.
*Clearly this is not only antisemitic; it's also Islamophobe.
+I don't mean to deny that Spinoza anticipates key elements of Kant's views on the limitations of public speech.
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