Second, realists deny that we need such a regulative idea to guide us here and now: just because we cannot have certainty about what perfection demands, it does not follow that we cannot pick out injustices that ought to be remedied (Sen, 2010). There is no reason to believe that such an anti-theoretical approach must engender a worrying complacency towards the status quo (contra Nussbaum, 2000). If we recall that our ways of life and our ethical and political concepts have a history, there is little temptation to assume that our political world ‘is a satisfactorily functioning whole’ as ‘some widely accepted parts of it may stand condemned in the light of perfectly plausible extrapolations of other parts’ (IBWD: 36–37). Working from within, we can therefore reinterpret ‘what is ethically significant, so as to give a critique of existing institutions, conceptions, prejudices and powers’ (IBWD: 37).17 Conflict between our moral sentiments is a ‘historically, socially, and probably psychologically conditioned phenomenon’ – a result of the pluralistic nature of modernity and the cultural changes that have accompanied it – and it is not a rational requirement that it be avoided (PHD: 162). Rather than attempting (unsuccessfully) to resolve such conflicts theoretically, the most useful thing philosophical reflection may do is to explain why they have a basis in various sentiments we hold dear (PHD: 164)....
We all have prevolitional or pre-reflective concerns; commitments to actual states of affairs and courses of action among actual people which will give our prescriptive political arguments their purpose. While philosophical enquiry can help us to understand them better, there is not a great deal it can do to either systematise them or justify them in the ways political moralists typically desire. If we take seriously the idea that we must make sense to those whom we speak, there is little reason to assume this activity cannot guide political action. As a result, realists ‘should not concede to abstract ethical theory its claim to provide the only intellectual surroundings for such ideas’ (ELP: 198 [quoting Bernard Williams--ES]).--Edward Hall "How to do realistic political theory (and why you might want to)" European Journal of Political Theory, Vol 16, Issue 3. [Emphases in original]
Realism in recent political theory (drawing on a long history going back to Thucydides and quite a bit of Nietzsche), a movement centered on analytic political theory as practiced in Britain, is inspired by the writings of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss and their rejection of Rawlsian ideal theory [although G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin often make more convenient targets]. Realists dislike moralism in political theory -- and especially symbolic moralism, they often invoke the image of Kant at the Court of King Arthur -- and dislike the 'applied ethics' sensibility that permeated political philosophy for the last few generations.* A central example of this is the desire to resist treating legitimacy as reducible to questions of justice; and to see the question of political authority and order as fundamentally a political issue first. It does not follow that realists are non-normative; but they tend to prefer, when they turn to normative questions, as the quoted passage reveals, immanent critique with references to historical and social conditions that are politically salient and accessible to existing political communities. (And so reject moralizing with abstract, ideal theories relatively far removed from political life).
As regular readers will know, I share with the realist a resistance to treating political philosophy as a species of applied ethics. I also dislike the moralism of our political philosophy and also reject the assumption of full compliance because, as I once noted in a controversial piece, if people were moral, we could do away with a lot of our liberal, democratic practices; liberalism is a set of institutional responses to human imperfection (including immorality). It should not presuppose moral behavior (even if it encourages it in various ways).
Even so, realists have a tendency -- it's not a necessary entailment -- to dislike and reject the demand for systematic theory. They much prefer reliance of contextual judgment (because realists have a healthy and admirable suspicion of the technocratic tendency in much contemporary liberal theory). But even if one were to fully grant their criticisms of ideal theory, one need not throw out systematic theory. One can embrace the fruitfulness of systematic theory without becoming technocratic. And that's because systematic theory has three political virtues (recall also this piece on Adam Smith and Jacob Levy):
- A system can allow one to risks of always acting in ad hoc fashion and, thereby, allow one to grasp which compromises are worth accepting and which undermine one's political, strategic, and (yes) moral aims.
- That is, some kind of system is required to guide (not control) long-term planning and to allow trade-offs to be modeled and, where possible, foreseen.
- Being guided by a system generates the possibility of consistency over time.
Now, obviously 1-3 are connected in various ways. One underlying connection is a kind of rationality requirement that is most obvious in 2-3. And so obviously some of these virtue can also can be claimed by the technocrat or the central planner. (This is where realists come surprisingly close to Hayekians who also reject systematic theory because they worry it will become a source of social control.) But this kind of rationality is very different from the expectation that individuals or collectives are by nature or by inclination rational (which realists are rightly suspicious off) or moral.**
For, it is worth noting (and I close here) that by being able to model these trade-offs transparently one need not have to trust the expert (and her hidden wisdom, practice, knowledge etc.) That is to say, an overarching, systematic theory can also be a way to combat reliance on local experts because it provides the constraining guidance/constraints in which they (say) optimize.
As I said above, the rejection of systematic theory is not a necessary entailment of realist political theory. So, one may understand this post an invitation to realists to reconsider their instinctive dislike of systematic theory.
*Full disclosure: one of my colleagues, Enzo Rossi, is one of the people articulating and extending realism.
**There is a further question on the relationship between such a systematic theory and the role of immanent critique, but about that some other time more.
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