113. The democratic city is the city in which every one of its inhabitants is unrestrained and left to himself to do what he likes. Its inhabitants are equal to one another, and their traditional law is that no human being is superior to another in anything at all. Its inhabitants are free to do what they like. One [inhabitant] has authority over another or over someone else only insofar as he does what heightens that person's freedom.
Thus there arise among them many moral habits, many endeavors, many desires, and taking pleasure in countless things. Its inhabitants consist of countless similar and dissimilar groups. In this city are brought together those [associations] that were kept separate in all those [other] cities-the vile and the venerable ones. Rulerships come about through any chance one of the rest of those things we have mentioned. The public, which does not have what the rulers have, has authority over those who are said to be their rulers. The one who rules them does so only by the will of the ruled, and their rulers are subject to the passions of the ruled. If their situation is examined closely, it turns out that in truth there is no ruler among them and no ruled.
114. Yet those who are praised and honored among them are [a] those who bring the inhabitants of the city to freedom and to everything encompassing their passions and desires and [b] those who preserve their freedom and their diverging, differing desires from [infringement] by one another and by their external enemies while restricting their own desires only to what is necessary. These are the ones among them who are honored, [deemed] most excellent, and obeyed.
Any of the other rulers is either equal to them or inferior to them. He is their equal when, in return for his producing the goods they will and desire, they bestow on him honors and money equivalent to what he does for them. Then they are not of the opinion that he has superiority over them. They are superior to him when they bestow honors on him and establish a share of their money for him without receiving any benefit from him. -- Al-Farabi Political Regime, Translated by Charles Butterworth.
'Democracy', here, means direct election. (Another way of putting it is, perhaps, elected kingship.)* In it the ruling norms consist of human equality and freedom. The main point of a democracy is preference satisfaction. In the paragraphs to follow, Al-Farabi describes democracies as naturally, welcoming, cosmopolitan, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies ("the nations repair to it and dwell in it, so it becomes great beyond measure. People of every tribe are procreated in it by every sort of pairing off and sexual intercourse.") Democracy is presented in dazzling colors: it is "the marvelous and happy [polity]. On the surface, it is like an embroidered garment replete with colored figures and dyes. Everyone loves it and loves to dwell in it...."
While Al-Farabi does not ignore the great crimes that democracies can produce, and he himself prefers a more hierarchically ordered, epistemocratic polity in the manner of Plato, he is more generous than Plato (in Republic VI) toward democracy: for him it is an egalitarian society, where (recall his interest in public enlightenment) the arts, science, and philosophy can flourish and where virtue can be nurtured. This is not the place (recall) to deal with his puzzling treatment of, the transition problem, that is, of how a virtuous city can arise out of a democratic polity despite its animosity toward would-be-virtuous-rulers (who are "soon deposed or killed, or his rulership is disturbed and challenged." [See here for more on his views.])
When he discusses democracy, Al-Farabi's treats citizens and rulers alike, in the manner of a public choice theorist, as calculating agents: "when rulership in it is surrendered to someone, it is....because the inhabitants...took money or some other recompense from him." (116) The citizen-electors are clearly bought by the leader they elect. But self-interest does not stop there. The citizens also expect the ruler to protect their freedom and to satisfy their "passions and desires." In turn they honor or pay their leader. That is, they understand his rule as a trade with the governed. If he performs his part of the bargain, "they bestow on him honors and money equivalent to what he does for them."
Now, at this point, perhaps prompted by Plato, one expects a treatment of the democratic ruler as, himself, ruled by passion, seeking to satisfy his unruly preferences who may turn into a tyrant. But that's not what we get; rather, Al-Farabi thinks a democratic leader is more akin to a useful puppet, ultimately "subject to the passions of the ruled." He is an instrument of other people's desires. And, he can only get honor and money if he satisfies their needs. This is reflected in the understanding of public virtue in a democratic city. As Al-Farabi goes on to say: "according to" the people in a democratic state, "the virtuous ruler is the one who is excellent at deliberation and fine at using stratagems to gain them their different and variegated desires and passions, preserving that from their enemies, and not depriving [them] of any of their money but restricting himself only to what is necessary for his power. (117) That is, for Al-Farabi, democratic citizens understand themselves as being in a zero-sum environment and admire their ruler for looking out on their behalf and who will do what it takes to defend them against outsiders. That is to say, despite the apparent cosmopolitanism, even a flourishing democratic society will have a strong sense of who is in, and who is out.
The title of this post mentions paradox. It goes something like this: preference satisfying people understand the world in terms of scarcity and deals that respect proportionality. Their anthropology involves other people being like them in looking out for themselves. Yet, they want to be ruled by a ruler who keeps taxes low, schemes on their behalf, and tries to get the better of foreigners and their enemies. They will pay for that performance. But what is striking is that the ruler is not expected or supposed to look out for himself in his bargain with the city: he is supposed to restrict himself to what is "necessary" not to what he really wants for himself nor is he supposed to try to change the people (those who try are, recall, "soon deposed or killed.")That is, they want a ruler who serves their interests and, crucially, is ultimately not like them at all and not really possible in how they understand the world.
Okay, that's not a real paradox. But it follows from Al-Farabi's view, that in a democracy, the people will be either eternally disappointed in their leaders or be hoodwinked, knowingly.
*It is worth considering if Al-Farabi was reflecting on a historical source -- the first Caliphs were elected by consensus -- or thinking through the type a priori. If he expects his readers to reflect on the election of the Four Rightly-guided Caliphs then what follows is one of the most important commentaries.
Comments