Although far too many contemporary academic philosophers take an excessively narrow approach, focusing solely on writings rather than persons and dismissing as ad hominem argument a central element of much of the philosophical tradition, there are always powerful critics around ready to challenge that prejudice . . . Current academic opinion on what is or is not "philosophy" might be more reflective of the institutional imperatives and limits of academe than of the larger historical practices of philosophy. This book reflects the belief that one needs the works and the lives, the words and the deeds, in order fully to harvest the contributions of the great philosophers (4-5, italics in original)--[Bart Schultz]
I do not find this line of thought as exemplified here persuasive. When Schultz writes about standard philosophical criticisms of the utilitarianism of Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick, he typically draws on and summarizes (very nicely) the work of contemporary academic philosophers. [A] The problem with the utilitarians to which he devotes much more attention than standard philosophical treatments is their attitudes to colonialism (on which Bentham does strikingly well, Mill much less so, Sidgwick perhaps in the middle). But if the problem is supposed to be that J.S. Mill, as a matter of biographical fact, was insufficiently critical of imperialism and colonialism, it is surely all too easy to argue that this is not a problem with utilitarianism but with Mill himself. [B] Utilitarianism as a first principle can only be applied if it is supplemented with empirical facts. Get those wrong and you will get the wrong results, but that's no problem for the theory....Are we, for instance, supposed to decide whether Moore or Ross is right about consequentialism by biographical evaluation, or by examining their political attitudes?--David Phillips @NDPR, reviewing Bart Schultz, The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians, Princeton University Press, 2017, 437pp., $39.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780691154770. [I have addede [A] & [B] for ease of exposition--ES]
I have not read Schultz’s book yet, but regular readers know (recall) I am sympathetic to two notions of integrity: to simplify, (i) professional integrity, which is about the coherence between one’s professional comportment and philosophical views/arguments; (ii) philosophical integrity, that is, the coherence among one’s philosophical views and arguments, professional credit, and one’s character cohere. In addition, while I have reservations about the cult of genius/greatness and the attention to boy-wonders (recall), I am sympathetic to the idea that philosophical exemplars can play a fruitful role in shaping our philosophical life (recall this post). Of course, it does not follow that I agree with Schultz’s stance on such matters; I would have to read the book (and I just admitted that I didn’t). What follow is largely (but not wholly) agnostic on the nature of integrity.
Rather, if it is “surely all too easy to argue” some X, maybe you should ask yourself what problem you are skipping in your embrace of X? In fact, as a rule of thumb, it’s generally the case when somebody uses ‘surely’ there is no there, there. Here I have in mind the two arguments labeled [A-B] above. Phillips thinks he can exculpate utilitarianism of its contribution to some of the great evils it helped promote – let’s stipulate that these evils are not intrinsic to utilitarianism – by blaming, recall [A], those that adopt utilitarianism and, recall [B], the empirical facts. But Phillips does not explain why he – or rather -- utilitarianism is entitled to this move. To get clear on this we need to introduce some distinctions. In what follows, I’ll focus on [B], but once you see what I am up to, I’ll think you’ll be able to do the same exercise for [A].
Let’s call a (moral) theory that delivers the right practical results in most empirical circumstances robust. Let’s call a (moral) theory that delivers the right practical results in only a few empirical circumstances delicate. Let’s call a (moral) theory that in most empirical circumstances delivers the right practical results, but disastrous results sometimes, fragile. (By contrast, a robust theory has fairly insignificant misses.) Let’s call a (moral) theory that in most empirical circumstances rarely delivers the right practical results, and often disastrous results, flimsy. Obviously, this taxonomy is not exhaustive. (If you like probabilities and utilities, you can introduce formulas if you want here and develop a very fine-grained approach.)
Now, even if we blame the “empirical facts,” utilitarianism is not robust (in the sense used here). If fact, in addition to colonialism, it also has been used to support eugenics by very able practioners (see Edgeworth; recall also the racialized version in Galton and here). So, while further study, perhaps, would be needed before one could call it flimsy or delicate theory, it is certainly a fragile theory. What's notable is that a utilitarian, especially, has ample resources to reflect on the significance of such fragility. For example, we might say (with a nod to Minimax) that (say) a (satisficing) moral theory,* other than utilitarianism (which is fragile), that can avoid the disasters may well be preferable to a utilitarianism if it delivers decent enough practical results all of the time (so if it is context invariant). [One may even be tempted to make this argument on utilitarian grounds.] This is especially preferable, if utilitarianism itself offers no guidance when one is likely to get the "empirical facts" on which it relies in application wrong.
As an aside, it is peculiar that Phillips does not stop to pause to reflect on what the differences in the great nineteenth century utilitarian attitudes to colonialism (recall “on which Bentham does strikingly well, Mill much less so, Sidgwick”) reveals about the nature of utilitarianism and its relationship to [A]. For if three competent users of the theory can deliver such different verdicts (and relying on broadly similar empirical facts) about a major issue (colonialism), it is not so easy to decouple theory from the personality of the particular utilitarian that deploys it. [This is yet another kind of lack of robustness.] In particular, if it is agreed that Bentham reached the right verdict and Mill/Sidgwick, who are both understood as better, even first rate philosophers (while poor Bentham is treated (uncharitably) as “no philosopher”… “Or, more charitably and in a more modern idiom, Bentham emerges as the first great utilitarian applied ethicist,”) not, one may well wonder if utilitarianism does not naturally generate expert-overconfidence in its best users. (Some other time I’ll discuss why utilitarianism, especially, is prone to such expert-confidence.)
Okay let me get back to the main argument. Because of the work of Heather Douglas, philosophers of science are familiar with the idea of inductive risk—delicate, fragile, and flimsy (in the sense used here) theories all instantiate species of inductive risk. Now, the inductive risk may not be known in the early stages of a theoretical development of utilitarianism, but once it has been revealed that a theory is not robust it is (willfully) negligent to ignore it. It is especially important not to ignore it because the down-side risks of error (colonialism, racialized eugenics) are shifted on vulnerable others. (That is the say, if a theory is not robust, but the mistakes it generates are only born by the users, then the rest of us may wish to ignore the problem.) Of course, a negligent theory may well be better than its rivals, so I have not offered here a refutation of utilitarianism.
It is worth noting, that eighteenth century moral theory – the theories that utilitarianism displaced – took the likely effects of moral theory very seriously (or so I argue in my book [and recall here]). Either way, Phillips is just wrong that the inductive risk (and expert over-confidence) that utilitarianism generates is “no problem for the theory;” it is, and Schultz is to be commended for taking the problem seriously from within the tradition and, thereby, showing the possibility of reflective and responsible utilitarianism worth having. In so doing he does his tradition a great service. I’ll be read his book with interest.
*I am not suggesting satisficing is better than maximizing. I am just using it for illustrative purposes.
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