Responsible Speech after Hypatia

I am persuaded that this tension exists not merely because traditional speculative philosophy frequently cultivates mystification and conscious irrationalism in matters of strict philosophy, but because it has repercussions upon social theory and practice, as recent events have amply shown. Analytic philosophy has thus a double function: it provides quiet green pastures for intellectual analysis, wherein its practitioners can find refuge from a troubled world and cultivate their intellectual games with chess-like indifference to its course; and it is also a keen, shining sword helping to dispel irrational beliefs and to make evident the structure of ideas. It is at once the pastime of a recluse and a terribly serious adventure: it aims to make as clear as possible what it is we really know.--Ernest Nagel (1936) "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. I" Journal of Philosophy, 9.

In the wake of the Hypatia debacle there is a renewed interest in the role of care in scholarship (see this discussion prompted by Lisa Miracchi at Dailynous). I have seen it said that analytical philosophers are clueless about research ethics and that they treat the people they write about as objects not as interested parties or ends in their own right [fill in your favorite egregious example]. (Apologies for not citing any given person in particular.) Often such comments are accompanied by praise of critical theory. Now, it's true that there are strands of critical theory which, in conversation with some of the social sciences (especially anthropology and sociology), have developed fairly sophisticated reflexive practices and research methods that allow for the development of species of responsible speech.* (Medicine and psychology have also developed such practices.) Together with professional economists (but cf. De Martino), analytical philosophers do seem, at first glance, to stand out for a lack of interest in responsible speech. But it does not follow that analytical philosophy lacks interest in responsible speech and lacks (historical and conceptual) resources to engage in it.

Before I get to that, by responsible speech I mean to talk about the circumstances in which philosophical speech, in the well-intentioned pursuit of truth, may foresee-ably harm others and one tries to prevent such harm(s). This is especially a matter of concern when those harmed are vulnerable members of society which lack resources or access to participate on equal footing in philosophy (and policy environments influenced by philosophical speech). In recent scholarly (broadly analytical) literature such issues are not unfamiliar and they are discussed by philosophers of science  in terms of inductive risk (Heather Douglas) and by epistemologists in terms of epistemic injustice (e.g., Miranda Fricker) and (Spivak's notion) of epistemic violence (Dotson). One indirect consequence of such harm, and which  generates an enlightened self-interest in it, is that the institution of philosophy may, fairly or not, come into disrepute (I call this the Socratic Problem).

The nature and practice of responsible speech is a traditional concern within and of philosophy. Arguably it goes back to the many layered charges against Socrates who is said to have corrupted the young (politically). If one pays attention to it, concern over it is present in most philosophical epochs. Even Enlightenment thinkers (who may have thought be rather optimistic and irresponsible in such matters--fill in your favorite egregious example on race and empire) show an interest in it. Recall my treatment of Žižek's interest in Kant's taboo articulated in Die Metaphysik der Sitten on inquiry in the historical origin of states; while that Enlightenment hero of free speech, Voltaire, opposed the diffusion of atheism among the ruling classes on prudential-political grounds.

As regular readers know, I tend to think (inspired by Gregory Arnold Frost) that Ernest Nagel is responsible for putting together the elements of the image of analytical philosophy that became widespread in North America (among analytical philosophers and scientific pragmatists and their critics).+ As the quoted passage above reveals, analytical philosophy has two functions: first, it's a place of refuge where certain intellectual skills are practiced and developed. As an aside, the idea that philosophy is like an intellectual game "with chess-like" features has been re-animated by Dan Dennett in his paper, Higher-order truths about chmess. Let's call  the first function, analytical Stoicism. The second function is an enlightenment project in which "irrational beliefs" are dispelled (the military metaphor is self-conscious in Nagel) and to make "evident the structure of ideas." Presumably, Nagel's idea is that when the structure of ideas is clarified we know what we really know and, thereby, can unmask irrational beliefs.

And, in fact, the second function of of analytic philosophy is aimed at a species of irresponsible speech that is said to be cultivated by "traditional speculative philosophy" which "frequently cultivates mystification and conscious irrationalism in matters of strict philosophy," and "has repercussions upon social theory and practice, as recent events have amply shown." (9) Now, Nagel does not explain how the mystification and irrationalism influences social theory and practice. But he takes for granted that his readers are familiar with the tenets of "romantic irrationalism that have "engulfed Europe." (5)

The concern with responsible speech is not limited to Nagel. In the debate with Heidegger, it becomes clear that Carnap's voluntarism, which is most majestically expressed in the free choice of a stipulative language, is, as Abe Stone+ has shown, an expression of our freedom to take "responsibility" for the choice of language, for own "self-legislation as a rational (i.e., speaking) being." That is, Carnap's theoretical philosophy is, in part, rooted in a practical concern.  This Carnapian stance is accompanied, as Stone emphasizes, by a second species of responsible speech: "outside the borders of theory... [speech] may be attempted in brief hints." (Stone quoting the Aufbau). Theory is the realm of Nagel's clear ideas, but it is not the only realm of interest to humans (Carnap knew his Nietzsche and Lebensphilosophie). Such obliqueness can be discerned in the tradition from Carnap all the way to Williamson (see Liam Kofi Bright). The characteristic virtue of speaking obliquely is self-command.

Such self-command is not characteristic of Nagel's image of analytic philosophy. However, Nagel is not unaware of such self command within analytical philosophy. He explicitly presents Wittgenstein's reluctance to publish, Wittgenstein's unwillingness to grant "permission to attend his lectures" (17) to outsiders (like Nagel), and the generation of an "esoteric atmosphere" in Wittgenstein's circle (17). Whatever one may think of such esotericism (not to be confused with the Straussian kind), it is also instantiates self-command. Here the Stoic refuge becomes a safe house almost inaccessible to society and with extremely indirect, if any, impact on society.**

None of this ought to be surprising because the routine rhetoric that surrounds analytical philosophy is often filled with humdrum, consequentialist appeals often warning against alternative approaches (a recent Meme given wide circulation by some remarks of Dennett's [HT Dailynous] is that postmodern philosophy is responsible for alt-facts or pernicious relativism, etc.). Such consequentialist appeals are legitimate (even if often partial and not sufficiently reflexive.)

Now, one may think that that the functions of analytical philosophy, the Stoic and the Enlightenment project, have in common the encouragement to speak the truth come what may. Surprisingly enough that's not true of either function. The Stoic project is not oriented toward truth, but toward cultivation of skill (widely understood) at the (serious!) game. This is why in the seminar room and many of our publications, analytical philosophers have enormous tolerance for false thought experiments and unrealistic examples. It's also not true of the Enlightenment function of the project. For, its aim is to help dispel irrational beliefs in order to produce better "social theory and practice." (This is an expression of Nagel's pragmatism;*** I return to this below.) Truth is a means here not the end. To be sure, it does not mean that on this picture analytical philosophers wish to promote the false as a means to good ends (we're not in the realm of Government House Utilitarianism or Platonic noble liars), but it does mean that we can evaluate the project of clarification and analysis in light of an interest in responsible speech including the harms to vulnerable others because the business of analytical philosophy is, in part, to promote better practices. 

Now, the history of analytic philosophy is, in part, the blurring of the two functions (or an over-emphasis of the Stoical one--recall Isaiah Berlin's critique) which also got accompanied with both a retreat of interest in the social theory component of analytical/scientific pragmatism as well as a loss of interest in an ongoing meta-reflection in responsible speech. This is nicely illustrated with a google-ngram [but please treat such data with caution!] on Inductive Risk, which peaked in the 1960s-70s, and then almost disappeared. Somewhat alarmingly, this period of retreat was accompanied by great professional success (at the expense of other schools). It's an open question if such forgetting was a necessary (Kuhnian) condition for this professional conquest. Even so, there is no intrinsic reason why analytical philosophy can't engage in responsible speech; the question is rather if it wishes to learn from the practices developed across many disciplines and wishes to live up to its highest aspirations. 

 

 

 

*To be sure, this does not prevent critical theorists from also (even routinely) participating in knowledge practices inside philosophy and social science that efface the lived experiences and perspectives of the folk they write about. But that's a fight best left for others. (I thank my terrific PhD student, Lea Klarenbeek, for teaching me about the practices in migration studies.)

**I don't mean to be implying that analytical philosophy is the only recent school with an interest in responsible speech. I have explained how the difficulty of continental philosophy's writing is also an instance of it.

***Much to the annoyance [mea culpa!] of folk belonging to the American philosophy school, I tend to distinguish sharply between scientific pragmatism (associated with Nagel and his students; Quine, etc.) and American pragmatism associated with Dewey and his followers. The real story is messier than that, of course.

+In Stone, and also in Nancy Bauer, we see the influence of Cavell's (Austinian) interest in responsible speech.

Comments

[Paul Franco]

Long-time reader, first-time commenter. Thanks for this post. I like the idea of a concern for responsible speech as a guiding thread throughout analytic philosophy, especially as it brings folks like Austin and Carnap closer together than they might have understood themselves.

I also appreciate the attention drawn to the inductive risk literature. On this point, some recent work in values and science has taken a more explicit turn to thinking about responsible communication in scientific contexts (I say 'more explicit' because I think the concern with responsible communication has been more or less implicit for awhile, though slightly obscured by focus on acceptance/rejection). I think these arguments can yield more general lessons too.

Stephen John is skeptical we can formulate workable criteria for responsible communication in most scientific contexts: https://philpapers.org/rec/JOHIRA-2

Drawing upon Austin and speech act theory, I'm less skeptical about formulating such responsibilities in communicating scientific results: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688939?journalCode=phos

Finally, Jacob Stegenga and Jan Sprenger have a nice paper that touches on communicative responsibilities turning on the use of results by physicians and patients when reporting outcome measures: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12801/1/Sprenger%252BStegenga%2520Outcome%2520Measures%2520final.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwj7yaL91tbTAhVQzmMKHWfbA5cQFggcMAA&usg=AFQjCNEza7B71GQkVgxibZmoalf8KdQM0A

[Tristan Haze]

'The Stoic project is not oriented toward truth, but toward cultivation of skill (widely understood) at the (serious!) game. This is why in the seminar room and many of our publications, analytical philosophers have enormous tolerance for false thought experiments and unrealistic examples.'

Interesting post, but I must admit, the above bit strikes me as outrageous! What about the obvious defense that 'false thought experiments and unrealistic examples' are highly relevant to philosophical truth-seeking since, if one wants to know the truth about whether, for some X and Y, all cases of X are necessarily cases of Y, then far out yet possible scenarios can often be relevant by showing that cases of X are not necessarily cases of Y?

[Eric Schliesser]

Dear Tristan,
I am not surprised you disagree about the point you quote. I agree that the defense you articulate is probably widely held by our professional peers. But (i) even if we grant the method at face value, it is more conducive to a species of falsification than truth finding.
In addition, (ii) it is by no means obvious that the method is really conducive to philosophical truth-seeking--but that's for another blog post.