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Paul Franco

Long-time reader, first-time commenter. Thanks for this post. I like the idea of a concern for responsible speech as a guiding thread throughout analytic philosophy, especially as it brings folks like Austin and Carnap closer together than they might have understood themselves.

I also appreciate the attention drawn to the inductive risk literature. On this point, some recent work in values and science has taken a more explicit turn to thinking about responsible communication in scientific contexts (I say 'more explicit' because I think the concern with responsible communication has been more or less implicit for awhile, though slightly obscured by focus on acceptance/rejection). I think these arguments can yield more general lessons too.

Stephen John is skeptical we can formulate workable criteria for responsible communication in most scientific contexts: https://philpapers.org/rec/JOHIRA-2

Drawing upon Austin and speech act theory, I'm less skeptical about formulating such responsibilities in communicating scientific results: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688939?journalCode=phos

Finally, Jacob Stegenga and Jan Sprenger have a nice paper that touches on communicative responsibilities turning on the use of results by physicians and patients when reporting outcome measures: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12801/1/Sprenger%252BStegenga%2520Outcome%2520Measures%2520final.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwj7yaL91tbTAhVQzmMKHWfbA5cQFggcMAA&usg=AFQjCNEza7B71GQkVgxibZmoalf8KdQM0A

Tristan Haze

'The Stoic project is not oriented toward truth, but toward cultivation of skill (widely understood) at the (serious!) game. This is why in the seminar room and many of our publications, analytical philosophers have enormous tolerance for false thought experiments and unrealistic examples.'

Interesting post, but I must admit, the above bit strikes me as outrageous! What about the obvious defense that 'false thought experiments and unrealistic examples' are highly relevant to philosophical truth-seeking since, if one wants to know the truth about whether, for some X and Y, all cases of X are necessarily cases of Y, then far out yet possible scenarios can often be relevant by showing that cases of X are not necessarily cases of Y?

Eric Schliesser

Dear Tristan,
I am not surprised you disagree about the point you quote. I agree that the defense you articulate is probably widely held by our professional peers. But (i) even if we grant the method at face value, it is more conducive to a species of falsification than truth finding.
In addition, (ii) it is by no means obvious that the method is really conducive to philosophical truth-seeking--but that's for another blog post.

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Here's a link to my past blogging (and discussions involving me) at: New APPS.


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