First, after the end of Dutch colonial empire, Dutch foreign policy became very simple: (i) sign up for european integration to prevent another war between Germany and France; (ii) get the UK involved inside the European Union as a trade-friendly counterweight toward France and Germany; (iii) promote the NATO as the means to be an American protectorate within Pax Americana; (iv) use tax treaties with the U.S.A. and a creative revenue service to become a financial haven for lots of multinational corporations; (v) promote human rights as the acceptable face of Western hegemony while ensuring that The Hague becomes the capital of the human rights industry. In more recent years, (vi) make sure that ecological targets/taxes do not hurt Dutch (petrochemical and transportation) industry.+ During the last year, the foundations under nearly all of these aims have been shaken or, worse, undercut.
The Euro-debacle and financial sector weakness is undermining (i)--perhaps not fatally, but it is too early to tell. Brexit is destroying (ii) and may still harm (i), too. Brexit is not only a political drama; the Dutch economy is intertwined with the English--we share multinational corporations, shadow-banking, and huge amount of trade. Trump has generated doubt about America's willingness to defend all the Nato members from threats, and the recent spat between Erdogan's Turkey and Holland is sowing doubt on the willingness of Western Europeans to come to Turkish aid if necessary. (A few years ago the Dutch and Germans sent missile defense systems to Turkey--that could not garner much support now.) Almost certainly proxies of various Nato allies are fighting each other in Syria. Without strong American leadership, NATO's days (iii) are doomed. Brexit will partially undermine Holland's tax status because (a) the British/English will compete with the Dutch, and (b) it will strengthen the Euro-centralizing hands to harmonize european taxes. Dutch attitudes against human rights have hardened if these entail treating fellow Muslim-citizens and refugees fairly--not to mention that Trump is destroying (v), but may aid in Dutch efforts at (vi).
Almost none of this was discussed during the election. {I am not suggesting foreign policy was entirely absent--the well-timed Turkish spat proves otherwise.} Of course, all politics are local politics, and the Netherlands has followed trends from elsewhere: political debates centered on values and attitudes toward Islam. But the Netherlands is also one of the largest trading nations in the world (let that sink in) and due to its huge pension-funds also one of the largest exporters of financial capital (let that sink in). Basically, the parties, media, and voters co-conspired to pretend that Holland's condition in the world does not matter. (This was noticed at the end of the campaign by those concerned about climate change.)
Second, unless exit polls are very very far off [UPDATE: they were not], it's a historic night: on high turn-out, Christian Democracy and Social Democracy are now small minority forces in Holland (jointly under 20% of the vote)--less than a generation ago each would have had about a third (or more) of the vote. The two dominated the political culture of the Netherlands for almost a century. (That's a gross simplification because for at least half of that period Catholics and protestants were not natural allies, to put it politely.) They built the Dutch welfare state, with its enormous patronage and spoils system (including appointed mayors, and profitable quangos that dominate large swaths of the (rather extremely efficient and productive) economy). [A] The collapse of social democracy has aided the Greens, neo-Marxists, and progressive liberals. [B] The collapse of Christian democracy has aided the revitalized conservative-liberals (that's a European thing) who under prime minister Rutte (the first Dutch liberal prime minister since the nineteenth century and full franchise) have become increasingly conservative (and less liberal in the classical sense) and the neo-fascists. Interestingly enough, [A-B] are long-term western European wide phenomena (even England fits this pattern to some extent), except in Germany thus far. (In fact, in Germany it seems the social democrats may be reviving which would make Germany exceptional in lots of ways.)
Third, the bad news is that our neo-fascists did well and are a major political force despite high turn-out. (A note on terminology: it used to be that Geert Wilders was 'merely' xenophobic and euro-skeptic, but in this election he slid into anti-democratic authoritarian fondness.) They did not do so well as expected, say, a year ago or their very best result (2011). But they did better than the last parliamentary election (when voters punished the PVV for removing its support for the then government). To put it in historical perspective: the PVV is polling far better than the then (very real) national socialists did at the height of the depression in the 1930s. They may still end up in second position and if the exit polls are just a bit off (not unusual these days), they may still end up partial king-maker if the Christian democrats and the VVD of prime-minister Rutte end up with a combined 50-55 seats (out of 150). In fact, it's only because Wilders has resisted turning his party into a real party (he is its only member) -- and so the next generation of would-be-leaders is not really being trained/cultivated -- that we can hope that the neo-fascists will fade or collapse due to lack of quality leadership. But that's not because of lack of impact: all kinds of illiberal ideas have now become mainstream thought. And there is a never-ending cycle of rhetorical abuse and stigmatization directed at fellow Islamic citizens (a non-trivial number of whom also harbor illiberal ideas and fondness of Erdogan).
The good news is that, a centrist coalition with some modernizing parties may well be in the cards (although more likely the patronage/spoils system will stay intact and will just be taken over by new winners).* Dutch coalition negotiations tend to be tricky, and due to rather evenly distributed number of votes/seats for the top six parties there are lots of routes to a coalition. If that coalition will be stable is, I suspect, partly out of its own hands because (and to come full circle) the Netherlands will face some existential choices that will be forced upon us from abroad, including upcoming elections in France and Germany.
+The Dutch gas industry has a strategic partnership with Russia's, but that is relatively recent.
*Among big challenges that were barely discussed: a housing market that facilitates bubble-formation and high entry prizes; a financial and government sector that rely on rising real estate prices and so fragile to crashes; a slow transition to a green economy.
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