The real meaning of royal authority is that it is a form of organization necessary to mankind. (Royal authority) requires superiority and force, which express the wrathfulness and animality (of human nature). The decisions of the ruler will therefore, as a rule, deviate from what is right. They will be ruinous to the worldly affairs of the people under his control, since, as a rule, he forces them to execute his intentions and desires, which it may be beyond their ability (to do). This situation will differ according to the difference of intentions to be found indifferent generations. (But) it is for this reason difficult to be obedient to (the ruler). Disobedience makes itself noticeable and leads to trouble and bloodshed.
Therefore, it is necessary to have reference to ordained political norms, which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits. The Persians and other nations had such norms. The dynasty that does not have a policy based on such (norms), cannot fully succeed in establishing the supremacy of its rule. This is how God proceeded with those who were before.
If these norms are ordained by the intelligent and leading personalities and (best) minds of the dynasty, the result will be a political (institution) on an intellectual (rational) basis. If they are ordained by God through a lawgiver who establishes them as (religious) laws, the result will be a political (institution) on a religious basis, which will be useful for life in both this and the other world.--Ibn Khaldun "The Meaning of Caliphate and Imamate," The Muqaddimah translated by F. Rosenthal.
According to Ibn Khaldun all political rule is grounded in group feeling (sociability, sympathy, cohesiveness). It is such group feeling that generates the authority of a ruler, who is required in order to maintain both intra-group (minimal) unity, and the dispositions proper to it as well to maintain property rights, as well as to organize the group militarily in its competitive dealings with other groups. (Ibn Khaldum assumes that the international area is zero-sum, governed by scarcity, and in permanent demographic conflict.) For Ibn Khaldun it is obvious that such authority goes to those who have what he calls "superiority and force" and are capable of maintaining it (in practice, he thinks that such capability deteriorates predictably over time in a dynasty). Authority used rightly will be rewarded, with luck or God's will, with internal peace and political might (abroad) and this, in turn, will facilitate more group-feeling.
Of course, in practice, superior power is likely to be abused and this generates political disorder. Not unlike Isaiah [recall], and later Spinoza and Hume, Ibn Khaldun takes political disorder as a sign for bad rule. The abuse is a consequence of the ruler imposing his wishes on the group such that they have "to execute his intentions and desires." That is, Ibn Khaldun presupposes that political rule exists to promote the group members' individual desires and aims so long as these are compatible with basic morality as well as intra-group (minimal) unity and survival/power. (I return to this below.)
Successful polities unities develop norms* that simultaneously (i) put a check on abuse of power by authorities and, thereby, (ii) ensure that the people submit to the laws. Allegiance to such norms (involving fairness, predictability, etc.) by the rulers reduces uncertainty and generates confidence that abuses will be avoided. This in turn, facilitates the exercise of authority within the group.
It is quite clear that Ibn Khaldun thinks that it is the task of a political science or, perhaps, philosophical history (recall) to develop and articulate local norms apt for the polity. That is, we should understand his own enterprise (and this justifies it, too), in part, as laying the foundation for such political-norm-generating activities which allow a political unity to start approximating a rational order. (It won't be a first-best city in which philosopher-kings rule, but it could be a species of second-best.) Here, Ibn Khaldun acknowledges that a secular rational order is possible.
I mentioned above, that for Ibn Khaldun bad political rule invites disobedience. In fact, unjust rule in a state with a religion that promises an after-life is likely to have "many religious people who follow the ways of religion come to revolt against unjust amirs. They call for a change in, and prohibition of, evil (practices) and for good practices. They hope for a divine reward for what they do...[even at the] risk being killed" (as most do according to Ibn Khaldun). So, in effect, in badly governed states such a religion is a source of additional disorder. By contrast, Ibn Khaldun thinks that in states that are well governed, religion promotes group feeling -- by greatly reducing variance in intentions and interests (which is the clear political utility of the right sort of religion) -- and military might (willingness to die, which is how he explains the Arab-Islamic victory over the Persian and Roman empires).
In the passage above, Ibn Khaldun also points to another aspect of the political utility of religion. It can be a source for the proper norms that are apt for political rule and thereby prevent abuse, and reinforce political authority. These norms can even be part of Sharia, and thereby, sacred. The point is not original with Ibn-Khaldun. As we have seen, in a back-handed compliment to the (Islamic/theistic) philosophers [i.e., Al-Farabi/Ibn-Sinna], Al-Ghazali [recall] had also insisted that both revelation and philosophy could be the source of the proper norms that are apt for political rule. But whatever the differences among the philosophers, Al-Ghazali, and Ibn Khaldun, all agree that religion can persuade non-philosophers while philosophy can rarely do so on its own.This is the political justification of religion in terms of political science.
Of course, religion does not merely guide the faithful in the service of earthly matters, it also prepares them (and again Ibn Khaldun agrees with the philosophers here) for the world to come, and because of the finitude of human life (and because the "entire world is trifling and futile," this non-wordly interest captures our true interest and offers a further justification for ensuring that authority and religion coincide (after the age of Prophecy in the hands of the Caliph).
But here I note that lurking in Ibn Khaldun's analysis is not just the though that a secular rational order is possible (which he probably thinks is not desirable), but also idea that one can evaluate the role of religion in terms of its utility (benefits/harms) to facilitate (proper) political authority.
*I hope a native speaker can help me figure out what the word so translated is and means. I wouldn't be surprised if a better translation wouldn't be 'mores.'
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