In so many areas of inquiry...philosophical argument ends up bottoming out in a mere clash of intuitions, of considered judgments. But what happens now? Because these considered judgments will help determine the content and structure of our philosophical theorizing, to determine (once and for all) what the good life is for a person...we—or so it would appear—need to settle which of these intuitions are the right ones.To put my cards on the table, this seems like an impossible task. Indeed, it’s a task that seems (almost by definition) outside the bounds of philosophical argument. After all, if philosophical arguments (sometimes) bottom-out in intuitive bedrock—Hellraiser good!; Hellraiser bad!—that’s where the tools of philosophical argument seem most impotent. But if this task is impossible, I wonder whether philosophers really ought to conceive their overall project as one that would require it. After all, we only need to settle which intuitions are the right ones if we are in the business of deciding whether, e.g., objectivism or subjectivism about well-being is true. But there’s an alternative. Rather than seeing ourselves as answering the “big questions”, as it were, we see ourselves as exploring how to construct alternative theories, what such theories must take on board, their relations and interconnections without settling which account of the “big question” is the right one. To borrow a metaphor from Ryle (though to somewhat different effect) we might think of the product of philosophical inquiry as a map or road atlas: a clear account of which routes one might take through logical space, without settling which route is the “right one”. (This need not commit to there being no right answer—just that it’s not the task of philosophical inquiry to determine what it, in fact, is.)
Thinking of philosophy in this way has some benefits...First, it provides a more compelling account of philosophical progress....
Second, and to me most important, if we think of the philosophical enterprise in this way, the ultimate task of philosophy becomes fully collaborative. If I’m a welfare subjectivist, the success of the project at which the objectivist is engaged need be no threat to the success of my project. After all, we’re all working together to develop the most complete “atlas”. The fact that, when we reach bedrock, I go subjectivist and you go objectivist need not entail that we are philosophical adversaries.
There may be drawbacks; after all, we might be very interested in whether objectivism or subjectivism is true. Giving up the pursuit of the right answer may be disappointing. But I suggest we kick the tires on an alternative, which seems to me a natural result of reflection on the phenomenon of intuitive bedrock. But even if it isn’t, it is up to philosophers how to understand what they’re up to—indeed, up to each individual philosopher. My hope is that thinking of philosophy as a kind of atlas-drawing means that we’re better at our jobs, we see ourselves as working together, and we approach philosophical inquiry much more often in a constructive and collaborative spirit. Dale Dorsey "Intuitive Bedrock and the Philosophical Enterprise" @DailyNous.
Dorsey official offers a positive picture of (let's stipulate, analytical) philosophy in which (i) arguments are characteristic (or the tools) of philosophy. Then with (ii) division of intellectual labor in which (iii) sets of systematic entailment relations are explored; and, by so exploring (that is, by multiple theory-construction), there is (iv) philosophical progress, that, is we understand our theories (or maps) better. The negative picture is that (v) philosophy does not offer (let's call them) substantive grounds for the fundamental premises or posits in theories and so (this is the force of the example Dorsey starts with in his post at Daily Nous) can't help settle what "leading a good life" is.
Dorsey's diagnosis of (v) is that there is an insolvable clash of intuitions. But he does not note, that the clash cannot be resolved (in the context of developed, coherent theories) is a consequence of a tacit (!) democratic or individualist (moral) principle: each person's intuition is as good as another. This generates a kind of spirit of tolerance (Dorsey's "constructive and collaborative spirit"). There is also another, related reason why (i-iv) can't help settle what "leading a good life" is because arguments, while (let's stipulate) an instance of rationality, are supposed to be neutral in some sense. So, on Dorsey's picture philosophy lacks the "tools" to go beyond such neutrality. This is why philosophy can develop maps of the world, but it cannot help decide where one ought to go.
The problem with this picture is that a map without destination is pointless. Of course, a beautiful map may have aesthetic characteristics or be a collector's item--and that is not trivial. Now, on this picture, philosophy does not set ends, but aids others in navigating their way toward their ends. So, philosophy here is an instrument--again the instrument may well be beautiful and worth keeping around for all kinds of reasons. But what this account of philosophy can't do is explain the worth of any end, including (non-trivially) its own worth. That is to say, on this picture philosophy is, in its own terms, groundless. Of course, the maps may well be judged on consequentialist grounds, but what makes some such consequences better or not is a matter of convention or pragmatics. Dorsey is in good company here because, say, Carnap's proposals for conceptual or framework engineering do no better.
As an aside, you may think that (to use Kristie Dotson's perspective) philosophy as service is good enough philosophy (recall). Dotson explicitly allows, perhaps even starts, from the idea that philosophy is not self-justifying or autonomous, so must be a tool in the service of other ends. Fair enough.
But given his stated methodology, Dorsey has no right to his democratic or individualist (moral) principle: that each person's intuition is as good as another. (The previous sentence does no justice to his views on 'considered judgments,' but can be restated to do so.) After all, it's not the case that all maps have equal worth (again, Dorsey's position is more subtle because of the embrace of considered judgments.). Here he can't appeal to intuition because somebody who rejects this intuition may well reject the flat division of intellectual labor adopted by Dorsey (and may embrace a more hierarchical and less collaborative conception of philosophy). The problem, then, is not that Dorsey can't justify his own enterprise except on (somewhat ad hoc) consequentialist ground (although I think it is problematic), but rather that he also tacitly smuggles in commitments (like the democratic principle, the value of collaboration, etc.) that, in fact, despite the purported neutrality do take a partial stance on the good life without argument or justification--because it lacks the tools to do so. Something more than arguments and theories is needed, that is to say, we need a richer conception of philosophy.
Comments