The Letter against Derrida's Honorary Degree, re-examined.

The Times (London). Saturday, May 9, 1992

Sir, The University of Cambridge is to ballot on May 16 on whether M. Jacques Derrida should be allowed to go forward to receive an honorary degree. As philosophers and others who have taken a scholarly and professional interest in M. Derrida's remarkable career over the years, we believe the following might throw some needed light on the public debate that has arisen over this issue.

Derrida describes himself as a philosopher, and his writings do indeed bear some of the marks of writings in that discipline. Their influence, however, has been to a striking degree almost entirely in fields outside philosophy – in departments of film studies, for example, or of French and English literature.

In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among those working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the world, M. Derrida's work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour.

We submit that, if the works of a physicist (say) were similarly taken to be of merit primarily by those working in other disciplines, this would in itself be sufficient grounds for casting doubt upon the idea that the physicist in question was a suitable candidate for an honorary degree.

Derrida's career had its roots in the heady days of the 1960s and his writings continue to reveal their origins in that period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of elaborate jokes and puns (‘logical phallusies’ and the like), and M. Derrida seems to us to have come close to making a career out of what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or of the concrete poets.

Certainly he has shown considerable originality in this respect. But again, we submit, such originality does not lend credence to the idea that he is a suitable candidate for an honorary degree.

Many French philosophers see in M. Derrida only cause for silent embarrassment, his antics having contributed significantly to the widespread impression that contemporary French philosophy is little more than an object of ridicule.

Derrida's voluminous writings in our view stretch the normal forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition. Above all – as every reader can very easily establish for himself (and for this purpose any page will do) – his works employ a written style that defies comprehension.

Many have been willing to give M. Derrida the benefit of the doubt, insisting that language of such depth and difficulty of interpretation must hide deep and subtle thoughts indeed.

When the effort is made to penetrate it, however, it becomes clear, to us at least, that, where coherent assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial.

Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university.

Yours sincerely,

Barry Smith
(Editor, The Monist)

Hans Albert (University of Mannheim)
David Armstrong (Sydney)
Ruth Barcan Marcus (Yale)
Keith Campbell (Sydney)
Richard Glauser (Neuchâtel)
Rudolf Haller (Graz)
Massimo Mugnai (Florence)
Kevin Mulligan (Geneva)
Lorenzo Peña (Madrid)
Willard van Orman Quine (Harvard)
Wolfgang Röd (Innsbruck)
Karl Schuhmann (Utrecht)
Daniel Schulthess (Neuchâtel)
Peter Simons (Salzburg)
René Thom (Burs-sur-Yvette)
Dallas Willard (Los Angeles)
Jan Wolenski (Cracow)

Internationale Akademie für Philosophie, Obergass 75, 9494S Schaan, Liechtenstein. [Quoted from here.]

Today, I presented a guest-lecture in which I mentioned my transformative experience, qua philosopher of economics, with a distinguished, mathematical economist who used themes from Derrida (and innovated with them) in order to explain and articulate a philosophy of mathematical economics and, thereby, also made feel what the, as it were, life-world of a mathematical economist qua theorist is like. This encounter -- in the years when I was an untenured professor -- made me revisit my conviction that Derrida is bullshit, and made me realize that my acquaintance with Derrida's writings could be charitably described as very indirect. I had accepted the epistemic authority of others (on Derrida) without much thought, and it made me examine how much of my intellectual self-understanding was handed down by others without my conscious mediation. In preparing the lecture I looked up the famous letter protesting the intention to award a honorary degree to Derrida by Cambridge University.

It is sometimes noted that it is extremely unlikely that most of the signers had read much more of Derrida than I had by the time I left graduate school. What is not noted is that it is extremely unlikely that these signers had read much of each other. (Obviously there are exceptions! [No need to remind me that Quine and Barcus Marcus were pretty familiar with each other's work.]) They are an eclectic mix of anglo-phone analytical philosophers, anglo-phone 'analytical' historians of 19th and 20th century philosophy, european and anglophone Husserlians, European 'Austrian' philosophers, European analytical philosophers, and a few whom I wouldn't know how to characterize. Moreover, the use of 'European' is in some sense an anachronism because in the early 1990s there was no shared philosophical space (of the technocratic sort familiar from ERC grant proposals and journal rankings). As it happens, according to Barry Smith's own testimony, the future of European philosophy in the years after the fall of the Berlin wall is one of the main issues at stake; Smith was worried that after the collapse of political Marxism there would be an embrace of Derrida style "nihilism" at the expense of other pre-Marxist (local) "traditions." Smith's letter failed to prevent the awarding of the honorary degree to Derrida. But from the vantage point of two decades, we can say that the take-over of European philosophy by Deconstruction did not happen. As philosophical politics go that's a victory for Smith.

What's striking about the letter is that it tacitly appeals to canons of normal science (hence the analogy with physics): the disciplinary experts drawn from "leading departments" decide merit based on "accepted standards." (Accepted by who? Well, of course, by the members of the leading departments at "distinguished" universities.) The self-serving and self-reinforcing, conservative nature of such reasoning -- and let's stipulate that the letter only expresses uncontroversial truth --  is by now obvious. Known "influence" outside leading departments counts for nothing. We have to remind ourselves that it is not too difficult to construe narratives in light of these norms of "merit," that Descartes, Locke, Hume, Thoreau, Nietzsche would have also fallen obviously short. Given that  professional philosophers operate in a zero-sum institutional environment (for jobs, status, time, appointments, funding, etc.) it is by no means obvious that they even have incentives to collect the kind of evidence that would allow them to offer such utterances in an epistemically reliable matter.

Even if one allows that "clarity and rigour" are the true touchstone of quality in the "eyes of philosophers" (and one ignores my reservations), it is, in fact, somewhat amusing that it's only very recent affair -- with the rise of meta-philosophy -- that the methods of at least some of the signers are being scrutinized with care and attention. Even the friend of clarity and rigour can recognize other criteria (truth, fruitfulness, social/moral utility, etc.) that may trump "clarity and rigour."

Another striking feature of the letter is the utter contempt for the "Dadaists or of the concrete poets" as contributions to philosophy. (What philosophy, if not nihilism? Well, I am no expert, of course, but it be useful to see these as a contribution to the experimental art of living.) Evidently, philosophy is a serious enterprise. Now one need not be friend of Žižek (who makes Derrida seem highminded), to recognize that one, thereby, is in no position to recognize that sometimes -- maybe all the time in our fallen world in which our hands are sullied with innocent blood everywhere -- the stance of the jokester is the only morally responsible stance; undoubtedly there are other more earnest stances that are worth exploring, too.  I am not claiming this is so, but ruling this out a priori is, well, a philosophical mistake.

As an aside, the important point -- lost on the signers -- is that since Socrates we know that all genuine (and ersatz) philosophy always runs the risk of "ridicule" and that such ridicule is unavoidable absent philosophers-kings.

Finally, it is a bit odd (even if indirectly very clear) to see in a letter devoted to defending the standards of clarity and rigour, the same writing characterized as defying "comprehension" -- there is universal consensus ("every reader") assumed over this --, yet also being, somehow, "semi-intelligible" and being "either false or trivial." (Yes, I am sure, that with considerable effort, you -- you are well-trained, after all -- can turn this into a consistent triplet with the help of elegant distinctions.)

Undoubtedly, the infelicities I have noted in the letter to the editor are the consequence of haste, consensus formation among an eclectic group of professional philosophers, and editorial interventions. The letter got polemical work done, and, I am open to the argument that Derrida's philosophical politics merited this kind of response. But in so far as I have had this letter and effort praised to me when I was a student (and heard claims like these marshaled against other philosophers that needed to be rejected), I note that it is more revealing about the commitments of the signers than either about Derrida or the politics of honorary award granting.

 

 

 

Comments

[John Drabinski]

For what it's worth, I've always gotten a chuckle out of the alleged rigor in and of the appeal, while hinging so much of it on a terrible analogy. Philosophy is nothing like physics. Or barely at all, and insofar as the analogy has any purchase at all, it is in a small corner of the discipline. Maybe that's the point, though. To make the corner small and exclusive, because the entire history of white Western philosophy can't be matched to "physics." Or maybe that's also the point, which reminds me of a joke Terry Horgan used to make when I was in grad school at Memphis: "ancient philosophy? Oh, you mean Frege?"

In the end, you can see (at least in the U.S. context) the terms of philosophy's slow fade from academia in such a provincial idea of disciplinary purity, this shaming of cross-disciplinary appeal and influence (something no decent art history, literature, or history professor would claim).

I found this to be a sad and pathetic affair. I remember it well. Admittedly, I have my stakes: Derrida has deeply influenced by work, and this sort of configuration of what's "real" philosophy has exceptional racialized effects (it makes nearly the entire black intellectual tradition non-philosophical). It is for me a kind of Donald Trump moment for the discipline. All bombast and xenophobia, very little content.

Not that you asked!

[Lorenzo Peña]

We were not a heterogeneous bunch (or an eclectic collection) but a set of philosophers regarding ourselves as belonging to the analytical tradition started by Frege and Russell. Clarity and rigour are a methodological canon shared by most philosophers before Kant. But Frege raised up that ideal to a higher level of standards.
On the other hand many French philosophers in the 20th century have followed the path of obscurity, gibberish, gratuitous and often cryptic statements without logical connection. I have both read and heard Derrida (I am half French myself). Horrible!

[Schliesser, Eric]

Thank you for your comment. A former student of Leo Apostel is always welcome, Dr. Lorenzo. Your co-signers are not all analytical philosophers. For example, Karl Schuhmann (a great philosopher-scholar) was not and a few others also not. You hereby confirm my claim that some of you probably lack familiarity with the work of some of your distinguished (and not so distinguished) co-signers.

Frege is swell -- too bad about his virulent anti-semitism [so odd to mention him while dissing other people's politics!] --, but your claims about pre-Kantian ideals are phoney gibberish (unless you think neo-Platonism [in many ways the dominant paradigm between Plato and Kant, if we include the Islamic philosophers] is all about clarity). But yeah, scholasticism also embraced rigor!

I leave your other comment for the amusement of more serious students of French philosophy.

[Schliesser, Eric]

Drabinski, philosophy is not fading from academia. But you do well on a soap-box; you make a natural blogger.

[Carlo Ierna]

"What is not noted is that it is extremely unlikely that these signers had read much of each other. (Obviously there are exceptions!"
I'm pretty sure that the exceptions overshadow the rule here. Smith, Haller, Mulligan, Schuhmann, Simons, Willard, and Wolenski were quite certainly very much aware of each other's works, given their numerous collaborations, publications in the same collections and journals, and overlapping interests. You manage to produce a list of topics that seems to pull them apart, but at the core they are all share an interest in the School of Brentano, realist phenomenology, and early Husserl, focusing on (formal) ontology, mereology, and logic, and sharing the idea of philosophy as science present in most Austrian philosophers. Both from a philological-historical as well as theoretical-systematical viewpoint their work is miles apart from Derrida's. I can very well imagine that they would not recognize what he did as "philosophy", just like Freud and Skinner might not recognize each other as "psychologists". Nevertheless, the letter does not say "Derrida is bullshit", though undoubtedly some of the signatories might well have thought so, it says "Whatever Derrida is doing, is not suitable to be recognized as a paragon of philosophy by a leading university". Whether Derrida's works "stretch the normal forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition" or contribute creatively to expand our horizons, i.e. whether or not it is at all philosophy, is quite a different assesment from giving him a very public and official seal of approval, setting him up as an exemplar.
Compare this incident to the local one to which we owed our two "Doctoraris". Albert Heijn was certainly a highly successful and visible businessman, but should he therefore be a dr. h.c.?

"It is sometimes noted that it is extremely unlikely that most of the signers had read much more of Derrida than I had by the time I left graduate school."
For a detailed critical discussion of Derrida by one of the signatories, preceding the affair, see e.g. Mulligan 1991 ( http://philpapers.org/rec/MULHNT ).

"I note that it is more revealing about the commitments of the signers than either about Derrida or the politics of honorary award granting." While I agree with your conclusion, it is quite an open door. I disagree mostly with your criticism of the signatories, with what you think they did and didn't know or intended. I'm sure you don't need to justify your new-found approval of Derrida by disapproving of his critics, at the risk of turning your arguments against yourself. I don't think you've read much of or about the signatories, otherwise you would have known how much of a open door it is to try to read into the letter a "tacit" and "implicit" support of philosophy as "normal science" and as "a serious enterprise", when there are quite a number of articles in which such positions are explictly taken and advocated (e.g. Mulligan-Simons-Smith "What’s wrong with contemporary philosophy?" in Topoi (2006) 25:63–67, but there are examples preceding the affair).

[Schliesser, Eric]

Carlo,
First, I agree that quite a few share an interest in the "School of Brentano, realist phenomenology, and early Husserl, focusing on (formal) ontology, mereology, and logic, and sharing the idea of philosophy as science present in most Austrian philosophers." (I thought I had said that in my post.) But that's 'analytical philosophy' only in a very extended sense of 'analytical.' And I sincerely doubt that this school was very well read by some of the other signers that don't fit this shared orientation. (I welcome genuine evidence to the contrary, but will remind you that Barry Smith's piece -- to which I link -- makes quite clear how little interest there was in his kind of work among analytical philosophers.)
Second, I am not defending Derrida; I am defending the use by Derrida by others. You would think that purportedly rigorous thinkers can grasp that simple distinction; that they do not suggests they are in grip of party politics. I am attacking the insipid and dangerous arguments of this letter. (In fact, my post clearly states that Derrida may well have deserved this kind of response.)
Yes, I am familiar with Mulligan's fine criticism of Derrida. It reminds me of the sort of paper that aims to show that Leibniz did not understand Plato--there is a sense in which it's all true and a sense in which it misses the point. (And, yes, I am also familiar with Claude Evans's work--he is a much valued former colleague.)
Finally, on the normal science stuff--I analyzed the letter not their other works for present purpose. I wouldn't use this letter to say anything about Quine's philosophy, although I think it gives a nice entry into his philosophical politics. But if I am misreading the letter, I would welcome learning that.

[Carlo Ierna]

Dear Eric,

You said that "They are an eclectic mix", but nearly half are actually a closely knit scholarly community.

"And I sincerely doubt that this school was very well read by some of the other signers that don't fit this shared orientation." I'm sure that at least Mugnai and Röd were well aware of the group I mentioned above. However, I think this is already more than suffcient to show that your initial judgment that "it is extremely unlikely that these signers had read much of each other" was a bit rash.

"only in a very extended sense of 'analytical.'", here we must agree to disagree. The idea of an exclusively "anglo-american" analytical philosophy is far too restrictive and historically inaccurate. Just look at Dummett: "A grave historical distortion arises from a prevalent modern habit of speaking of analytical philosophy as "Anglo-American". ... this terminology utterly distorts the historical context in which analytical philosophy came to birth, in the light of which it would better be called "Anglo-Austrian" than "Anglo-American"." Even the name itself probably originates with Stout's translation of Brentano's "Descriptive Psychology" as "Analytical Psychology" (as proximal cause, the distal cause is the analogy to chemical analysis which was also made by all involved).

What exactly is "insipid" and "dangerous" about their arguments? Is your problem with their claim that philosophy should have standards at all or with which standards they believe are the right ones? I'm sure the problem is on my end, but it is not at all obvious to me that their arguments are "self-serving, self-reinforcing, and conservative". After all, the signatories hardly represent "the establishment" and were not even successful. It's not like they could hire or fire anyone or act as gatekeepers for grant applications on a European level. So when you say "political" you cannot mean "institutional politics" since there were no European level institutions and they did not belong to a single local institute. Nor do they represent a hidden agenda, since both in the letter and their publications such ideas are openly endorsed and critically (as opposed to dogmatically) discussed. Why, to echo Derrida himself, would their thoughts about the nature of philosophy, not be philosophy but politics? If you take the letter as a dogma or the expression of a conspiracy, then you are indeed, in my opinion, reading it wrong.

[Eric Schliesser]

Look at your own language: you attribute to me a 'conspiracy' claim...there is not a shred of evidence you can point to that I think that about this letter. (I also do not think it expresses a shared 'dogma,' but that is a more subtle matter.) What's even the point of suggesting that I make such a charge (except De-legitimation?)?

I agree that there is core (although I am unsure even it is a common school) that is a relatively close-knit community (and I did not deny that [and it is pretty obvious from Smith's narrative about the letter]) -- I had not explicitly stated that so welcome your attempt at precision--, but to call it 'analytic' is revisionary in large extent (and I am perfectly fine with the European branches of analytical philosophy--nobody denies that Polish logicians and Viennese/Prague (etc.) positivists fit in. ['Analytical philosophy' in the modern sense was coined by Ernest Nagel in 1936, although there certainly were all kinds of analysists before him.] Leaving aside coinage, Husserl is simply not an analytical philosopher; if you want to treat Brentano as an important ancestor to analytic philosophy that's perfectly fine with me fww.
Yet, from the fact that there is such a core it does not follow that the signers all read each other. (And if you look at Smith's narrative about how he put together the list it's clear he also tried hard to recruit signers from outside that core. Again I pointed to the paper in my piece.)

On the agenda of the piece, I cite the authority of Smith (undoubtedly some signers had nothing to do with that agenda). He could be wrong and misremembering or I could be misunderstanding him. Maybe you should read his interview?

On the evaluation of the arguments of the letter, undoubtedly judgments will differ, but my arguments about it do not rely on sociological claims about "establishment" or "gatekeepers" (or grant-making bodies). Rather, I quoted the text. And all I did was to point to some tensions and tendencies within the text.

Their thoughts about philosophy are philosophy, their thoughts about awards published as a letter to the editor (that is aimed at a wider public) are a species of politics; I called it 'philosophical politics.' Feel free to call it another name, but to call it 'philosophy,' well...our paths must part.

[Lorenzo Peña]

Frege's reactionary political views are neither here nor there. His logical and philosophical output is what matters (from a philosophical point of view). Admittedly his examples betray his horizon, once you are aware thereof. But so many philosophers of all obediences and schools have been politically objectionable! Derrida himself, borne in Algeria, was not a partisan of Algerian freedom fighters. His "hostipitalité" concept, while purportedly pro-immigrants, conceals a deep disdain for a thorough open-door policy towards immigrants. And many other "French theory" thinkers (or rather writers) are definitely reactionary. Please, let politics alone when talking about philosophy.

[Eric Schliesser]

Lorenzo, we agree, in fact, that there is plenty of political ugliness to be found in all schools. But you can't praise Frege while dissing Derrida *because it reminds you of Dada (see your own letter)*, which was a movement that fused art and politics in non-trivial ways (it's your example not mine). (Or did you use 'Dadaist' because it sounded nice?) That is to say your own letter is political in all kinds of ways not the least of which it is a self-consciously public intervention to prevent a public recognition. It may also be philosophical (although I have noted some ways it's pretty sloppy as philosophy), but don't deny your own political gesture (it just looks foolish--I am an analytical philosopher, by the way, so feel kind of embarrassed on your behalf).

[Lorenzo Peña]

When you sign to a letter you are not supposed to know about co-signers, their credentials, motivations or background. Of course I was deeply imbibed with Quine's work (I hope the whole of it). I was and remain a Quinean of sorts.I was acquainted with the work of Ruth (whom I knewpersonally), David Armstrong and several other signatories, mainly the Anglo-Saxons. We analytical philosophers outside the Anglo-Saxon world were parias, poor dissidents, "despised and rejected and acquainted with grief". Derrida's exaltation was a bonus for our oppressors

[Eric Schliesser]

I fully believe you that there were "oppressors" and that "analytical philosophers" were akin to "poor dissidents" etc. That strikes me as true (and well grounded in history); it's important background to the letter. But that also lends credence to my claim that this letter is properly understood as an instance of philosophical politics.
[And YES OF COURSE cosigners of such letters are not supposed to have read everything or anything by each other.]

[Lorenzo Peña]

But, of course, Eric, the letter belonged in ACADEMIC politics; it did not aimed to be a philosophical output.
When philosophers have a pronouncement on matters of academic policy, or whatever else, they are prone to reason in a philosophical way, more or less, to such an extent as the context allows and demands it.
I signed the letter; hence you are right that it was mine, at least up to a point. However I had not written it. Probably my own draft would have been different and maybe stronger.
However it would not have been a philosophical essay.
For me signing the letter was an act of selfdefense against the antianalytical establishment.
But as regards the gist of the matter, not the details, I still think the letter was quite right: Monsieur Derrida did not deserve such a distinction. His works deserve to be let to the "oubliettes de l'histoire".