How Berkeley Invented the germs of Empiricism by (deliberately) conflating Newton and Locke

98....For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties.--Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)

Locke [1632–1704] undertook and successfully carried through what Newton had not dared to do, or perhaps would have found impossible. It can be said that he created metaphysics, almost as Newton had created physics.--Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1751) Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, trans. Richard N. Schwab

When Berkeley published the Principles  (1710), Newton had already published the first edition of the Principia, but not yet the General Scholium. So the proper metaphysical interpretation of the Principia was still up in the air. (In addition to the General Scholium, Cotes’s editorial preface to the second edition of Principia was also not published yet.)[1] Newton was keeping his metaphysical views close to his chest. Toland (who in his Letters to Serena combined instrumentalism with Spinozism) and Clarke (who in in his Demonstration defended a species of rationalism) had offered competing visions. In his correspondence with Stillingfleet, Locke had intimated that his views had become akin to  Newton’s (especially on gravity), but as Mary Domski, Lisa Downing, and Howard Stein have taught us, we should be cautious about conflating the view of Locke and Newton (despite their close friendship). 

In sections 110-111, Berkeley is explicit, that in fact that sections 97-8 are targeted against Newton: "111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space." (In 110 he had claimed the celebrated author is the author of "a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind."  A clear reference to scholium of the definitions of Newton's Principia.)

Even so, the quoted passage from section 98 at the top of the post does not describe Newton's position. For, first, there is no evidence that Newton thinks there is a simple idea of duration in the way that Locke does (Essay 2.15.9). It is not obvious that for Newton a finite mind can actually behold infinite duration, which, I have argued, is only introduced for theological reasons in the Principia. It secures for Newton God’s eternal existence in time (even though time is a necessary consequence of God’s existence).

Second, and more important, Berkeley is treating the simple idea of time as an abstraction. This is not an implausible reading of Locke's position (2.15.8). But there is no reason to believe that Newton thinks time-keeping or absolute time involves an abstraction (in either Locke’s or Newton’s sense). For, while Newton does take abstraction seriously in his physics -- he is explicit that “places and motions” are abstractions --, he does not claim this about time.

Third, Newton and Locke have different views of what abstraction is. Locke's account of abstraction, to simplify, relies on the way words can be signs of general ideas "and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence." (3.3.6) By contrast, in the Principia, Newton uses the traditional conception of abstraction by which we abstract from sensible qualities by removing or stripping features in order to focus only on those features of experience that are capable of being treated by quantities (recall my treatment of Buffon).

So, if Berkeley really has Newton in mind he is conflating Newton's position with features of Locke's in an incompetent fashion. It is not impossible, of course, that Berkeley is confused. But, while Berkeley can be sloppy about such matters, I see no reason to believe that he would conflate Locke and Newton as such. Rather, it is more likely that he is treating Newton on duration as an exemplary (and celebrated) instance of the problems that are generated by the doctrine of abstraction which he does explicitly associate with Locke (the metaphysician) in the Introduction, section 11. In fact, it strikes me that there are two main aims in Berkeley’s argument (in section 98): first, to attack the Lockean doctrine of abstraction and, second, to drive a wedge between Newtonian mathematical natural philosophy and the Lockean interpretation of it. On the first aim: this is, in fact, one of the main aims of the Principles as such. So, it is possible that Berkeley here treats a refutation of Lockeanized Newton as a strike against Locke’s metaphysics. 

The second aim may have been inspired by the Toland's rhetorical strategy in the fourth and fifth Letters to Serena. Once the Lockean interpretation has been discredited, Berkeley can offer his own re-interpretation of Newtonian mathematical philosophy along instrumentalist (or pragmatist) lines—that’s ultimately the project of De Motu and by then (1921) it’s clear that Berkeley is disagreeing with Newton’s own metaphysics. (This is pre-figured in the Principles.)

The historiographic significance is this: in the French Enlightenment, coupling Newton and Locke had become trope. (I have quoted d'Alembert above, but one can also cite Voltaire.) I had thought that this systematic coupling originates in Voltaire's teacher, the Dutch Newtonian 's Gravesande. But it is worth noting that Berkeley may have been the first to create a Lockean Newton in order to show that the Lockean metaphysical program leads to absurdity. In so doing he produced an intellectual dynamic that we have come to associate with "Empiricism'' such that Hume and Adam Smith (recall) had to offer their own view on the complex relationship among ordinary experience, abstraction, and scientific practice.*

 

*This post originates in a commentary on a very fine paper by Nate Scheff at the Eastern APA. I have benefitted from discussion with Lex Newman, Alan Nelson as well as Margaret Atherton and Matthew Steuart on facebook. They should not be implicated in my errors.

[1] Schliesser, E. (2013). On reading Newton as an Epicurean: Kant, Spinozism and the changes to the Principia. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(3), 416-428.

Comments

[Margaret Atherton]

Have you looked at what Berkeley says about time (and space) in his second letter to Johnson? It's interesting in and of itself as providing an elaboration of Berkeley's thinking on time, but it also seems to suggest to me that when Berkeley is thinking about space, he is thinking about Newton, and that when he is thinking about time, he is thinking about Locke, in particular Locke's view that the succession of ideas is the measure of time, whereas Berkeley wants to say that it constitutes time.

[Kenny]

On Berkeley and Newton, Luc Peterschmitt's paper "Berkeley et les hypotheses mathematiques" (Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences, 2003) is very helpful. The (very nicely phrased) conclusion: "[Berkeley] s'agirait de defendre le newtonianisme contre ses propres fantomes metaphysiques."

[Eric Schliesser]

Luc is very good, but we disagree. Berkeley is creating something anew, and it is not quite Newtonian.

[Kenny]

Luc understands the project of De Motu as purifying Newtonian mechanics of those metaphysical ghosts. I think this is right (as against earlier anti-Newtonian readings, such as Popper's). I thought that was in line with your position in "The Origin of Modern Naturalism": we're endorsing the Newtonian physics (as against Leibniz), but denying that it has the unsavory metaphysical implications the Leibnizians claim it does. We're doing this by walling off physics from metaphysics.

Of course, I do think it's important (and I take it this is part of your point here) that 'Newtonian' metaphysics comes in several flavors most of which were never openly endorsed by Newton himself.

[Schliesser, Eric]

Well, my view has been developed in Newton's Challenge to Philosophy (HOPOS 2010), where I return to Berkeley's engagement with Newton.
Of course, Berkeley (or Luc) can call Berkeley's position 'Newtonian,' but I think the spirit of the project is not just anti-Leibnizian, but also anti-Newton(ian), and that's because Berkeley wants to deny that Newtonian mathematical philosophy has authority to assign causes (but I believe Newton's science is causal through and through).

[Kenny]

That's certainly a fair point. I imagine that's how Newton would see it. But I think the way Berkeley sees it is that his philosophy of science allows him to accept Newton's mechanics (as opposed to Leibniz's dynamics) without accepting Newtonian metaphysics.

I haven't read your HOPOS paper. I'll have to look that up when I'm revising my book manuscript since I discuss some of these issues there. (I don't get into Newton interpretation, though.)

[Schliesser, Eric]

I don't think it's quite right to say that Berkeley wants to accept Newton's mechanics, because (i) he treats it, among other things, a-causally [and treating forces as causes is part of Newton's mechanics]--so there is redescription of the mechanics, too; (ii) Berkeley's version of Newtonian mechanics is pretty useless in doing new research; (iii) he is concerned with a questions of authority and he does not allow the mathematical natural philosopher to interpret his own theory.

[Margaret Atherton]

But I think you are still saying something different from Kenny, Eric, because what you keep pointing out are reasons why NEWTON wouldn't accept Berkeley's view of what he is doing. That can be right and it can still be true that BERKELEY thinks he is saving Newtonism from unacceptable bits of metaphysics. Look at Berkeley's first letter to Johnson.

[Schliesser, Eric]

First, there were Newtonians who disagreed with Newton (and each other) but who present themselves (and were sometimes anointed by Newton) as his followers (Keil, MacLaurin, Gregory, Cotes, etc.), and Berkeley does not fit THAT profile.
Second, you and Kenny are quoting a letter that was written several decades after the Principles--I think it is very unreliable to read later material into the earlier materia.
Third, I have offered my interpretation of the Letters in the HOPOS (2010) article.
Fourth, I think you and Kenny actually are not reading the letter correctly; Berkeley claims that he agrees with Newton's *method* (or at least that THAT method is consistent with his principles) -- and let's stipulate het gets that right--, but he is not self-describing as a 'Newtonian.' He cleanses the results of that method not just Leibnizian metaphysics, but also (as he acknowledges) of its own Newtonian physics -- not just the Newtonian matter theory or the stuff on space/time and EVEN motion--, but as he explicitly acknowledges, Newton's own account of forces as efficient causes. Even the instrumentalist interpretations of Newton that were out there (Clarke, 's Gravesande) kept a LOT more.
Fifth, in context Berkeley, is answering an objection to his metaphysics/philosophy that argues from the authority of Newtonian natural philosophy (broadly conceived) to the falsity of Berkeley's philosophy. And all he is claiming that this argument does not go through (if one grants him a lot). [In the Second letter Berkeley reiterates his differences from Newton.]

[Kenny]

I agree that Berkeley would not describe himself as a Newtonian full-stop, nor would he describe himself as a Newtonian about natural philosophy, nor (for that matter) would anyone else in the 18th century have been likely to describe Berkeley as a Newtonian (except perhaps some disgruntled Leibnizians). What I think Berkeley himself would say is that his philosophical theory allows one to accept Newton's mechanics (or be a Newtonian about mechanics, if you like) without being a Newtonian about metaphysics, natural philosophy, or, for that matter, calculus. I think this is already true in PHK, as indicated in section 110, though I think it's clearer in De Motu and Alciphron. (This is my view about most of the ideas central to my interpretation of Berkeley: they are already present in PHK but better developed and more clearly expressed in De Motu and Alciphron.) Berkeley's case for this claim involves a re-interpretation of Newton's mechanics which few, if any, Newtonians (certainly not Newton himself) could accept.

Of course, I recognize that there are excellent reasons for skepticism about reading a philosopher's later works back into his/her earlier ones. In the case of Berkeley I believe that this reasonable skepticism can to a large extent be overcome, but that's not a thesis that can be defended in blog comments of reasonable length!

[Eric Schliesser]

I agree, first, that there is genuine continuity between principles, De Motu and the letter to Johnson.
Second, the notion of 'acceptance' here is very very attenuated.
Third, it would be more accurate historically, to see Berkeley as accepting *Toland's* interpretation of Newton (one that was contested by all self-described Newtonians) while disagreeing with Toland's reinterpretation of the metaphysics.
Fourth, I think the secondary literature on Berkeley has done itself a big disservice to treat Berkeley as a kind of (revisionary) Newtonian without recognizing that this is neither a properly historical category nor really gets at at a proper conception of the debate over intellectual authority. [As I pointed out in my lecture at the APA, there has also been a too quick conflation of Locke's and Newton's views and so the dialectic is not handled properly.]

[Margaret Atherton]

I'm not sure what you are saying is historically accurate, Eric. Are you suggesting that Berkeley learned his interpretation of Newron from Toland? I wouldn't want to take on the entire secondary literature on Berkeley but I do find myself sympathetic to what Kenny said.

[Schliesser, Eric]

No, I am not suggesting that Berkeley learned his interpretation of Newton from Toland (although it is not impossible and it is even plausible), but that Berkeley's stance & strategy toward Newton is very close to Toland's (except that they disagree about metaphysics). Anyway, I have explained my interpretation in light of the Letter to Johnson, and I think I have not heard arguments for why that's wrong.

[Margaret Atherton]

That's in the 2010 paper. I'll try to track it down when I get a chance.