[I]f by their Speculations rightly placed, the Study of Morality and the Law of Nature were brought more into Fashion among Men of Parts and Genius, the Discouragements that draw to Scepticism removed, the Measures of Right and Wrong accurately defined, and the Principles of Natural Religion reduced into regular Systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other Sciences: There are grounds to think, these Effects wou'd not only have a gradual Influence in repairing the too much defaced Sense of Vertue in the World; but also, by shewing, that such Parts of Revelation, as lie within the reach of Humane Inquiry, are most agreeable to Right Reason, wou'd dispose all prudent, unprejudiced Persons, to a modest and wary Treatment of those Sacred Mysteries, which are above the Comprehension of our Faculties.--Berkeley (1713) “preface” of the Three Dialogues.
Berkeley offers a kind of ‘intellectual-trickle-down’ theory.[1] He addresses his arguments to “those, who are most addicted to speculative Studies,” but the consequences of their combined judgments, would radiate out to the other (less speculation-addicted) learned, the professions, the wealthy and, eventually, to the lower orders of society.
According to Berkeley, he is motivated to close the gulf that has opened between modern philosophy and what he calls “common life.” This gulf leads, he believes, to skepticism not only about the existence of God but also, anticipating the Introduction to Hume's Treatise, about the use and relevance of philosophy. So, Berkeley acknowledges the continued existence of a version of the old problem going back to the time of Socrates between philosophy and common life. Berkeley wants to “rescue” the addicted from their paradoxes and atheism (“the wild mazes of philosophy”) and “reduce” them “to common sense.” While the cure may be hard to swallow at first, the result, the “return to simple dictates of Nature,” will be “not unpleasant.” If the therapy works, then, through a kind of intellectual trickle-down effect, “the study of morality and the Law of Nature” will be revived; the appeal of “skepticism removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the Principles of natural religion reduced to regular systems." Finally, it will allow the knowable parts of revelation to be acceptable to “right reason,” and the other parts to remain “sacred mysteries.” (The previous paragraph and the following draw on this paper.)
We can say, and we have been anticipated by certain readers of Wittgenstein, that Berkeley’s philosophical system is a kind of antidote to philosophy. It is designed to make the learned experience the world from the point of view of the common sense vulgar. In fact, a principle of his therapy is that, despite his flirtations with ethnic hierarchies elsewhere (recall), there is no difference in kind between the “natural philosopher and other men”--a thought he shares with Mandeville and assimilated by Hume and Adam Smith all of whom applied this analytical egalitarianism more consistently than Berkeley.
In the quoted passage from Berkeley’s Dialogues the word “system” is used to describe a mode of organization of the explanatory principles of a particular science (i.e., natural religion; in the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume, too, treats ‘natural religion’ as one of the sciences).[2] To be systematic, then, here means that such explanatory principles of a science, or intellectual discipline, cohere with each other and are properly connected. (As an aside, this is the central sense in which Adam Smith also uses the term “system.” (recall)) Berkeley’s plural (“systems”) suggests that for him a single science or theory can contain multiple, coherent and properly connected explanatory principles and so can be a collection of systems. Presumably, once the systems are fully integrated into a single set of connected and coherent explanatory principles, a science can be thought of as a single system or a unified theory. It is not a huge leap from this intra-scientific (or intra-disciplinary) notion of ‘system’ to an inter-scientific notion of ‘system’ in which the explanatory principles of different sciences cohere and are connected with each other.
This latter, inter-scientific notion of ‘system,’ is part of the self-described aim of Hume in the Treatise: “we in effect propose a compleat [sic] system of the sciences.” In context, Hume suggests that such a complete system of all the sciences, is only possible if one science, the science of human nature, or “the science of man,” is epistemically foundational to the other sciences. In Hume’s Treatise this science is composed of multiple systems (e.g., his system of generating “general idea,” (1.1.7.16) “system concerning space and time,” (1.2.4.1), etc.).
The known up-take of Berkeley by Hume -- he calls him a "great philosopher" -- suggests that even planned intellectual trickle-down can have many unexpected consequences.
[1] Kant, too, appeals (in “Was Heist, sich im Denken orientieren”) to the analysis of a doctrine's effects in terms of the worthiness of freedom (of thought). That worthiness is understood by Kant in terms of both a doctrine's likely consequences, by way of intellectual-trickle-down on a larger public and it's impact on other intellectual currents of thought (for discussion, see O. Boehm 2015: 221-2).
[2] In eighteenth century philosophical jargon, a ‘principle’ is an explanatory ground, often causal. In the context of a science or a discipline, ‘principle’ is a foundation (e.g., an axiom, or common notion).
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