On Hume and Smith Being a Systematic Philosopher

This is the Hinge of your system.--David Hume on The Theory of Moral Sentiments to Adam Smith, 28 July 1759

In his forthcoming intellectual biography of David Hume, James Harris points out that after the youthful Treatise, Hume does not self-describe his own writing(s) as 'systematic' or a 'system' in his works (even though he continues to describe other people's writings in those terms). This is surprising given how important this feature is (see here for an approach). For example, Hume writes in the Introduction: "to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." Some other time I explore what follows from Harris' observation (including Harris' interpretion of this).* Even so, it is worth noting that Hume is reported (including by Adam Smih) as battling other people's "systems of superstition" to the end of his life; so, even if Hume is no longer himself a systematic philosopher after the Treatise, he remains concerned with the effects of systematic thought on human affairs.

Recent literature, inspired by Hayek's concerns over social planning (in part), on Adam Smith has paid considerable attention to Smith's criticisms of the "man of system" who is "apt to be very wise in his own conceit" (see, for example, here). And if you start reading The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), you quickly encounter Smith's concern with how "the judgments of mankind [can be] perverted by wrong systems." And a few pages later, he implies in a deflationary matter that a "system of philosophy" as such (so not its consequences) is not a matter of much interest.

But as is also well known, Smith also notes that, as a matter of fact, the "love of system" can activate the most "noble and magnificent" political and philanthropic projects, and "public spirit," even though he is aware that such love can become excessive and then turns into a (problematic) "spirit of system" among other problems (recall this post). So, presumably Smith must approve of systems that can generate the right sort of love, and avoid the excessive kind. In fact, in the final edition of TMS, Smith specifies that one feature the right kind of systems have in common is that they promote caution about implementation (here's why: "to insist upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every thing which that [systemic] idea may seem to require, must often be the highest degree of arrogance.") And in Wealth of Nations, Smith himself promotes this gradualist feature in his own system on grounds of humanity and fear of "disorder" (see here for discussion).

At the start of the last edition of TMS, Smith remarks that:

In the last paragraph of the first Edition of the present work, I said, that I should in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. In the Enquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as concerns police, revenue, and arms. What remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been hindered from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me from revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of doing what I can, I have allowed the paragraph to remain as it was published more than thirty years ago, when I entertained no doubt of
being able to execute every thing which it announced.

So, Smith clearly thought that his works were part of a larger system. In that "last paragraph," (of TMS) Smith is explicit that Grotius falls short by not being systematic enough.

As an aside, to be sure, Smith recognizes that being systematic is not itself (to use an understatement) truth-conducive. As he puts it in Wealth of Nations: there are many "systems of natural and moral philosophy" whose "arguments" rest on "very slender probabilities, and sometimes [are] mere sophisms." In fact, Smith argues that concern over how the appearance of systematicity can mislead, explains the origin of logic. (As is well known, Smith's "History of Astronomy" has a very finegrained analysis of the social epistemology of the revolutions among scientific systems.)

Be that as it may, unlike Hume, Smith, who was a careful student of Hume's writings, was eager to call attention to his own aspirations to systematicity even (as we have seen) in "advanced age." This strikes me as an important starting point for any appreciation of their relation.

 

*This post was promoted  by Harris' keynote at the 2015 Hume society conference.

Comments

[Roy Tsao]

Lucid & informative post. One thought: You might perhaps find it pertinent to your discussion to consider D'Alembert's distinction between the old 'esprit de système' and the Enlightenment 'esprit systematique' (in his Discours préliminaire to the Encyclopédie).

[Eric Schliesser]

Yes, Roy (if I may?), thank you; that's a very important reference for Smith. I explore some of the connections between D'Alembert's Discourse and Smith's philosophy of science in some articles I published a decade ago.)