A related concern is the potential of the No-Alternatives argument for strategic (ab)use. Scientists whose research agenda is tied to a certain dominant hypothesis H have an incentive to denigrate any emerging to H as 'inacceptable' until they can assert that no alternative hypothesis to H have been found for several decades and that 'in light of the No-Alternatives Argument' anyone who is proposing alternatives to H is actually engaging in 'pseudo-science.'--Frederik Herzberg (381) commenting on Dawid, Hartmann, and Sprenger "The no alternatives Argument."
We argue that the failure of finding a viable alternative to theory H, in spite of many attempts by clever scientists, lowers our expectations on the number of existing serious alternatives to H. This provides in turn an argument that H is indeed the right theory. In total, the probability that H is right is increased by the failure to find an alternative, demonstrating that the inference behind the no alternatives argument is valid in principle.--Dawid, Hartmann, and Sprenger summarizing their position.
We argue that the failure of finding a viable alternative to theory H, in spite of many attempts by clever scientists, lowers our expectations on the number of existing serious alternatives to H. This provides in turn an argument that H is indeed the right theory. In total, the probability that H is right is increased by the failure to find an alternative, demonstrating that the inference behind the no alternatives argument is valid in principle. - See more at: http://blog.oup.com/2014/04/inferring-the-unconfirmed-the-no-alternatives-argument/#sthash.dEYLU5oA.dpuf
I had made a mental note to study the paper by Dawid/Hartmann/Sprenger (hereafter DHS) when I read the abstract of a pre-print because I also have Herzberg's "related concern" about DHS. (To be clear Herzberg's paper is focused on the technical details of DHS and improves upon them.) My concern was not prompted by speculative, arm-chair reflection, but rather from studying how Kuhnian ideas on (monolithic and dominant) paradigms have been applied in a variety of sciences (and philosophy) during the last half century (see these two papers, here and here, and, of course, a lot of my blogging).
Herzberg's concern is a natural one for anybody engaged in public choice philosophy of science, that is, for the those of us that take incentives, institutional structures, and so-called images of science in science seriously. By an 'image of science’ I mean to call attention to a list of characteristics that function as a kind of short-hand for representing science; these characteristics are used in polemical or educational contexts often to justify or rely on the epistemic authority of a practice described as ‘science.’ This image is often accompanied by a privileged list of scientific norms or epistemic virtues. I call it an ‘image’ to highlight that when such an image is deployed, there tends to be lots of tacit commitments about the nature of knowledge, the nature of reality, the nature of society, and, also, the nature of science (etc.). Philosophy of science, including from the discarded past and the live present, supplies some features of images of science.
So, while not unlike Herzberg, I am impressed by the ingenuinity of DHS and I agree that it opens up important lines of research, we should be cautious about accepting DHS as establishishing a valid principle of inference even if we grant -- as they correctly argue -- that it is a principle deployed in the sciences. The reason for caution is an argument from inductive risk: in sciences with robust or highly confirmed background theories the no alternatives argument can do relatively little harm (at worst it entrenches a high quality status quo), but in sciences that lack such background theories the no alternative argument is an invitation to sociological abuse(s). As it happens, the human/social sciences are capable of great harms in human affairs, so we should be especially suspicious of the application of the no alternative argument as a valid pinciple of inference in those fields.
In fairness to DHS, when they discuss their own paper the call attention to an "important caveat:"
Based on the no alternatives argument alone, we cannot say how much the probability of the theory in question is raised. It may be substantial, but it may only be a tiny little bit. In that case, the confirmatory force of the no alternatives argument may be negligible.
The no alternatives argument thus is a fascinating mode of reasoning that contains a valid core. However, determining the strength of the argument requires going beyond the mere observation that no alternatives have been found. This matter is highly context-sensitive and may lead to different answers for string theory, paleontology and detective stories.--DHS
The caution is exemplary because DHS call attention to limitation of their own result (see my second and third norm of analytic egalitarianism) in a way that lets non-experts see what is at stake. DHS should be commended for this.
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