Atheism is a very pernicious monster in those who govern; that it is also pernicious in the persons around statesmen, although their lives may be innocent, because from their cabinets it may pierce right to the statesmen themselves; that if it is not so deadly as fanaticism, it is nearly always fatal to virtue....Some geometers who are not philosophers have rejected final causes, but real philosophers admit them; a catechist proclaims God to the children, and Newton demonstrates Him to the learned.--Voltaire (1764) The Philosophical Dictionary, Atheism. [See here for French version.]
During the last few weeks Voltaire has been rediscovered as the Enlightenment saint of freedom of expression and a fierce critic of religious fanaticism. By contrast, in his monumental (ongoing) series on the so-called 'radical' Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel treats Voltaire as a kind of villain, being the leader of the moderate Enlightenment (see here to get a flavor) and critic of more radical, Spinozism. As the passage above shows Voltaire was, indeed, an elitist* and hostile toward Spinoza's criticism of providential final causes and was happy to invoke the authority of Newton's arguments against him. (Spinoza is mentioned by name throughout Voltaire's article.)
In the quoted passage, Voltaire relies on a dialectic of false/ersatz philosophers (Spinoza) vs "true philosophers" (Newton) which means that we're in the realm of philosophical prophecy. Unlike many early critics of Spinoza (and false philosophy), Voltaire does not take primary aim at Spinoza's character: "it was not he assuredly who took part in the judicial assassination of Barneveldt;+ it was not he who tore the brothers De Wit in pieces, and who ate them grilled." From larger context it is clear that by 'atheist' (or 'real atheist') Voltaire means somebody who does not fear God. Voltaire's criticism of Spinoza is primarily methodological (reasons badly) and doctrinal (i.e., he rejects final causes, creation, has recourse to the hypothesis of the eternity of things and of necessity.) But given that Spinoza's atheism was by Voltaire's lights not complicit in (grave) political crimes, Voltaire has no problem with (Spinoza's) private atheism. Voltaire fears mob-rule and political instability.
Thus, Voltaire is a critic of both religious fanaticism as well as, what we might label, 'political atheism.' While their political consequences are not identical in both cases belief facilitates a lack of fear of death. Here I focus on Voltaire's concerns over political atheism. Voltaire's primary argument against political atheism is that it undermines the virtue of the ruling classes. By 'virtue' he does not merely refer to the personal morality/characters of the ruling elites; he thinks atheism undermines the political judgment of those that rule in society. In reflecting on his article, I discern two kinds of concerns about political atheism.
First, he fears wickedness in absolutist rulers, who without any concern of God's judgment, experience few barriers to beastly behavior (the last century provides plenty of exemplars). Second, more interesting, in a political order in which personal ambition can be rewarded, he fears destructive competition and lack of restraint among political elites. The problem with Cicero and Caesar is not their lack of fear of death as such, but that such fear emboldens behavior that led to the destruction of the Roman Republic. To put Voltaire's insight anachronistically, a lack of fear of death and opportunities for enrichment and enjoyment undermine not just 'esprit de corps' among the ruling classes, but also their public spirit. Voltaire's concerns resonate with anybody familiar with the rent-seeking and venality of more contemporary political insiders and financial elites. To what degree our political order with our elites can avoid the fate of the Roman republic is an open question.
I close with a reflection on Voltaire's attitude toward Spinoza. Voltaire comments, in passing, that Spinoza is "bold and misguided" [hardis et égarés]. What this entails becomes clear in Voltaire's unfavorable contrast of Spinoza to Hobbes.
Hobbes passed for an atheist; he led a tranquil and innocent life. The fanatics of his time deluged England, Scotland and Ireland with blood. Spinoza was not only atheist, but he taught atheism;
Voltaire praises Hobbes because he did not promote lack of fear of death; the fear of death is the corner-stone of Hobbes's political philosophy. By contrast, Spinoza's philosophy is at its core wholly life-affirming. Even if we grant, as my PhD student Jo Van Cauter argues, that Spinoza was more than happy to promote negative political affects to ensure the obedience of the masses, the philosophy Spinoza promoted among the elites is a species of political atheism in Voltaire's sense. This is what's bold and politically misguided according to Voltaire. It follows, then, that even if later Newton had never provided the refutation of Spinoza's atheism Voltaire thinks Spinoza should not have promoted Spinozism.**
Before we imply that Voltaire blames the Dutch republic's collapse (1672) on Spinoza's mistaken decision on what to teach the elites, Voltaire is also committed to the idea that philosophy is kind of impotent when it comes to the masses and their political behavior. Hobbes's more prudent philosophy could not undermine the murderous religious fanaticism around him, after all. Unlike Hume, Voltaire seems to have underestimated the destructive potential of public philosophy, that is, mass ideology, as a source of fanaticism as destructive as the religious kind he was familiar with.
That the Dutch republic collapsed is a philosophical problem that is too neglected. It was guided by an elite that was at the cutting edge of mathematics, natural science and commerce, that is, the modern exemplification of (Cartesian) philosopher-kings. It's because of not attending to this problem that Voltaire is a poor guide to our stormy times.
+Spinoza was not born yet at the time of Oldebarneveldt's execution. Even so Voltaire's remark is significant. Voltaire recognizes that the law can be bent toward wicked ends.
*He also compares several non-European nations ("Caffres, the Hottentots, the Topinambous") to "children." His contempt does not appear to be racist (in the 19th century sense) for the Chinese escape his scorn; rather his contempt appears to be cultural (they lack learning).
** Dan Garber has argued that one can generate this as an immanent criticism of Spinozism.
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