Why the Lack of Philosophical interest in So Many Social Sciences?

I had a great time at the most recent PSA in Chicago. I spent one day focused on papers on Isaac Newton; another day on decision theory; and the remainder of my time attending papers on science and values. Because I attended a whole bunch of sessions on decision theory, I noticed that there were almost certainly more people from the London School of Economics (LSE) than papers about philosophy of economics on the program (see here; a bunch of very good philosophers of economics gave papers on topics other than economics.)* When I reflected on the program, I could not discern many papers on the philosophy of sociology, the philosophy of political science, or the philosophy of anthropology. This pattern of neglect does not reflect a general bias against social science as such -- social psychology and network theory are increasingly popular areas in the philosophy of science, after all.

The pattern of exclusion is not just a feature of PoX ('PoX' = Philosophy of Some Science, X). Professional philosophy generally is not very interested in, or receptive toward, sociology, political science, anthropology, archeology, and even -- with the exception of bits of political philosophy -- economics. This despite the 'naturalistic' turn of the last four decades.

Now, I can kind of understand (although I don't condone it) why there is little interest in anthropology. During the last few decades professional philosophy has become very hostile toward views associated with relativism and pluralism; there is, thus, an instinctive aversion toward anthropology (the parts that are connected to Darwinian theory -- e.g., physical anthropology -- excepted). Sadly, this aversion toward anthropology also revives some of the worst and most entrenched features of the Western philosophical tradition; its disdain for what (echoing the Phaedrus) I called 'rustic wisdom' (recall) and the complicity in various forms of empire and colonialism (recall).

But I cannot understand the lack of philosophical interest in and reflection about sociology, political science, and archeology. Yes, I am familiar with some brave souls who are the exception to the rule stated in the previous sentence. And, yes, I know that Continental philosophy has ongoing interest in social theory and it is certainly much more connected to -- sometimes by way of direct intellectual lineage -- some of the classics of sociology than analytical philosophy is. But on the whole even that branch of the philosophical family is not really enmeshed in the (empirical) social sciences as compared to its immersion in the arts, literature, or psychology (including the varieties of psycho-analytical theory).

Perhaps, there is quite a bit of work in, say, social ontology or the nature of norms that draws on the social sciences that I (mistakenly?) think we exclude. Maybe I have missed a great surge in receptivity to some of the social sciences in these areas (I doubt it). But for reasons that I don't quite understand we prefer to draw on psychology and game theory (or law, etc.) if we must  draw on anything. On further reflection, I suspect that philosophy of law may be the main exception (in so far as it routinely draws on the social sciences), although, as I ponder it, perhaps, other areas of applied ethics also draw on social science. So, maybe the pattern of exclusion that I notice is restricted to philosophy of science and other relatively core areas.

Why this pattern of intellectual exclusion of so many social sciences exists, I don't know. One possible answer strikes me as patently bogus: that the results of (social) psychology or network theory are more robust than results in other social sciences.

 

*The PSA has opened its doors to sister-societies so there was, in fact, a whole session sponsored by the International Network for Economic Method (INEM).

Comments

[Enzo Rossi]

I'm working on a methodological critique of invisible hand arguments that draws heavily on anthropology, archeology, and economic history. But I only know a handful of other people interested in this sort of thing. It's tough because contemporary normative political theory is in love with conditional arguments, which are designed to isolate it from the facts (but they sometime fail to do so, or so I try to argue).

In philosophy of science it may be more of a matter of studying sciences with clear predictive empirical successes (in fact I think there's quite a lot of stuff on archeology). But there's also a resurgence of work in social ontology and other relevant bits of metaphysics, and it's odd that not more of it is couched as PoSocialScience. Ruth Groff's work may be a splendid exception.

[Anna Alexandrova]

All I am going to say is see below:

Session 5 (4:00 PM - 6:00 PM)
Contributed Papers: Methodology in the Social Sciences
Huron B – Level 2

Rosa Willemijn Runhardt (London School
of Economics): Evidence for Causal
Mechanisms in Social Science: Recommen
dations from Woodward's Manipulability
Theory of Causation

Robert Northcott (Birkbeck College, London): Opinion Polling and Election
Predictions

Alexandre Marcellesi (University of California, San Diego): External Validity: Is There
Still a Problem?

Chiara Lisciandra (Tint Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences):
Robustness Analysis as a Non-empirical Confirmatory Practice
Chair: Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (University of A Coruña, Spain)

[Eric Schliesser]

Dear Anna,
My post is not a criticism of the PSA or its very fine program committee! (My only complaint is that the session you mention was programmed at the same time as one of the Newton sessions!) But even that session -- and the PSA is a HUGE conference -- does not engage with some of the historically neglected social sciences.
Anyway, the point of the post is to get a conversation started about the sources of neglect--not to fingerpoint at any group.

[Mskochin]

I have found that a good way to test any general claim in the philosophy of science is to try to apply it to comparative philology, "the only exact science in the humanities."