One deflationary but non-trivial way to understand the role of historians of philosophy in the profession is as teachers that recruit the next generation of students by teaching some of the most enjoyable and exciting bits of philosophy (think Plato, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Wollstonecraft, Nietzsche, etc). A nice side-effect of this role is that the historians become the bearers of -- to use an elitist phrase -- philosophical culture that helps guide judgment and generates a sense of wider perspective. In an age of decreasing book-literacy, shortened PhDs and hyper-professionalization this is (to borrow an economist's term) a great public good. While the safe version of this role has a conservative bias toward canonical 'classics' -- we know these works 'work' --, it also encourages the historian to keep searching for works that might work equally well. And, of course, some classical texts stop resonating with students (perhaps, less classical than once thought), and can be replaced by new classics.
Another deflationary but non-trivial way to understand the role of historians of philosophy in the profession is as teachers of a key part of the curriculum that helps prepare students to understand the present. This can take three roles: (i) they teach material that has shaped the present and which provides a fuller understanding of central debates today (for example, courses in 'early modern,' Kant, and, increasingly, 'early analytic' often play this role); (ii) they teach material that can influence contemporary debates, especially if these need to recover lost ground (for example, courses that explore history of modality, grounding, virtue, moral psychology, etc.); (iii) they teach material that are at odds with contemporary approaches, but might help us better understand the possibility space and limitations of our own commitments.
Again, (i) has a status quo bias, but as professional interests change and philosophy develops, there is always a constant need for backward re-jigging of the curriculum. Given that at any given time lots of works influence future developments, historians play a key role in shaping the narrative that winnows what works are 'perceived' by later generations to have influenced the present. By contrast (ii) is often a 'recovery' operation. (So, for example, as neo-Liberalism has become important I try to teach Swift's "A Modest Proposal" or as gender issues have become more central in professional philosophy, a whole number of authors are being rediscovered--I have found it immensely stimulating to teach feminist texts in my early modern course; they have brought out gender/political themes in the works I already taught.) This does not always work; it is, for example, undeniable that Adam Smith's "History of Astronomy," prefigures a lot of history and philosophy of science of the last half century, but my undergraduates found it unfailingly boring. Option (iii) is great fun for a restless historian; one is actively encouraged to keep reading and to be on the look out for (to nod to Nietzsche) untimely work from the past.
There are other roles that teaching history of philosophy can play in the profession. I mention three: first, they express our own philosophical personality and indirectly convey what we might think important without, perhaps, preparing the students for professional philosophy. I love teaching philosophical texts where literary and conceptual issues have a complex interplay (Plato's dialogues, More's Utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis, Wittgenstein, anything by Nietzsche, etc.--obviously this list has considerable overlap with an earlier list. Even so, while I would happily teach Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics to undergraduates, but not for reasons of personality). Admittedly, not everybody's philosophical personality is best expressed by teaching historical works; but given that I find the contemporary journal-article-template so abhorrent it is no surprise I would go down this route. (Yes, I have read work I enjoyed published in last thirty years.) Second, they may help us challenge how we think of the enterprise of philosophy altogether. This is by now a familiar point, but as we peek into the past we can discern lots of works that from our vantage point straddle many disciplinary boundaries. Most of those boundaries are worth rethinking on regular occasions. (One example I participate in and teach my students is in re-reading Newton as a philosopher.) Third, to help us see the interconnectedness of issues/concepts. Given that our philosophical culture is overwhelmingly problem/puzzle focused, studying a systematic philosopher of the past can train the developing (and advanced) mind to learn to discern interconnected features of philosophy. The only contemporary philosopher who offers anything like it is David Lewis, and the key to his success is, in part, the modularity of his system (so reading his work in light of each other does not quite convey the benefit I describe, although it can be salutary for lots of other reasons). Teaching (and using) the method of counter-example is, in effect, a second-best solution to teaching systematic philosophers. By exploring counter-examples, including the outlandish ones, we learn to discern systematic entailment(s).*
I have used the phrase 'deflationary' to distinguish the remarks in this post from two other uses for the teaching of the history of philosophy: (a) the teaching of historical truths as an end in themselves; (b) the teaching of the past as a means of transforming the future.
*I thank L.A. Paul for discussion of this point.
Eric, you should really write something like this for the journal Teaching Philosophy.
Posted by: Ed Hackett | 10/23/2014 at 03:34 PM
Ed, I am afraid that I am unfamiliar with relevant literature that I would have to research from scratch. So I could only do it by co-authoring with an expert in the field. Any suggestions?
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 10/23/2014 at 06:30 PM
One role that I think is especially important in teaching history of philosophy courses is to help students hone an important (and under-appreciated) philosophical skill: sympathetic interpretation.
While sympathetic interpretation is important whenever one is engaging with another philospher's work, that skill gets a uniquely central place in history courses, and greater explicit treatment as a skill in its own right.
I think this is closest to your item (iii), but I am not sure they are exactly the same thing.
Posted by: Lewis Powell | 10/23/2014 at 06:50 PM
Yes, Lewis, I think that is an important skill that can be taught in history courses. A related skill is that one learns to become self-aware of one's often tacit assumptions and commitments as one struggles to understand another in order to generate sympathetic interpretation. (In the post I was not really focused on what skills can be taught by way of history, but I agree it's an important oversight.)
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 10/23/2014 at 07:52 PM
I think that Davidson is as systematic as Lewis, but not (as you aptly put it) modularized so well.
Posted by: Alan Nelson | 10/24/2014 at 03:50 AM
My impression is that while there will certainly be articles on the role of history in teaching philosophy, the journal articles are fantastic places for reflections such as these, and you would be well placed to share them in a more developed form.
And I am not too sure that we should consider experts in the field of "teaching philosopbhy" since we all teach, and this might mean you needn't go out and try to find an expert co-author. Like Williams addressing the arguments that there could be something called moral experts, I don't think one could ever claim to be an expert in teaching philosophy. If anything, one is more seasoned, and a lot of implicit details about one's situation goes into the claim of being an expert. General expertise foregoes the real possibility that there is a lot of nativist criterion that might make one a spectacular teacher at one institution, but effective less generally at other places.
Teaching is the one part of the profession that is most similar to all other aspects, and that if we are good teachers of philosophy, we never stop talking about teaching (both formally and informally). Teaching Philosophy is the only journal that gives voice to these types of reflections. Its a journal we all should be reading, IMHO.
Posted by: Ed | 10/24/2014 at 04:33 PM