On Historical Necessity and Morality (Art & Propaganda in John Williams's Augustus)

In the matter of passion, whether of love or war, excess is inevitable. Yet I have always been bewildered when, in the ease of peace, men raise the questions of praise or blame. It seems to me now that both judgments are inappropriate, and equally so. For those who thus judge do not judge so much out of a concern for right or wrong as out of protest against the pitiless demands of necessity, or an approval of them. Necessity is simply what has happened.--Maecenas to Livy, in John Williams Augustus: A Novel (70)

You forget that I am artist myself, and know the necessity of asking what to ordinary people would seem the most insulting and presumptuous things. How could I take offense at that which I myself would do, without the slightest hesitation, for the sake of my art? I detect the odor of a moralist. And it seems to me that the moralist is the most useless and contemptible of creatures. He is useless in that he would expend his energies upon making judgments rather than gaining knowledge, for the reason that judgment is easy and knowledge is difficult. He is contemptible in that his judgments reflect a vision of himself which in his ignorance and pride he would impose upon the world I implore you, do not become a moralist; you will destroy your art and your mind. And it would be a heavy burden for even the deepest friendship to bear.—Maecenas to Livy (128)—John Williams Augustus: A novel

There was no possibility of virtue without the idea of virtue; and no effective idea of virtue that was not encoded in the law.--Octavius to Damascius (302), John Williams Augustus: A novel

If we allow ourselves the thought, we probably tend to think of propaganda as not-art or, perhaps, as bad art.+ Williams's clever novel reminds us that some of the greatest art (Virgil, Horace, etc.) is, in part, propaganda for what we might call, military dictatorship and empire. In addition, in the second quoted passage above, Williams portrays the chief artist-propagandist, Maecenas, not just as a Spinozistic-fatalist -- with his repeated invocation of necessity --, but as would-be-censor of the historian Livy. It is to Williams's credit that he makes us see both the case for benevolent, imperial dictatorship as well as the price the establishment this extracts not just on the protagonists themselves (notably Augustus and his daughter Julia – ultimate Augustus trades the daughter of flesh and blood for an "adoptive daughter" [the Roman empire], a trade that, in turn, is said to be made legitimate because "acknowledged" by "the adoptive daughter" [that is the laws] (306; as if all trade requires the sanction of law) -- ), but also on the arts (history, poetry, and philosophy).

Few professional historians would claim that they are in the business of judging. In so far as Historicism has won the day (see Beiser's majestic book), historians see themselves as scientists (if not akin to natural scientists than at least as practitioners of their very own special Geisteswissenschaft) and not as moral judges. Obviously, even those that advocate moralism in history would wish to see it consequent knowledge.* Williams's (1972) novel (recall this post) subtly invite us to see constraints and power in (or outside) the margins of works of art, history, and philosophy. Williams's readers were familiar with the McCarthy era, of course, so, perhaps, they need little such reminding. It is an open question to what degree some readers at the time thought the US was, itself, heading -- amidst major disagreements over civil rights and Vietnam war -- toward its own civil war (and to what degree they were tempted to follow the model of benevolent dictatorship). Perhaps, too, Williams makes the reader reflect on the nature of the post US-Civil War settlement (which, after all, is a key feature of Butcher's Crossing (recall my post)).

In Williams's portrayal of Maecenas, art (poetic and historical) is (amongst other things) supposed to be useful. In context, it is entailed that if political circumstances had been different some other art would be useful. The moralist is said to be useless because he can't contribute to knowledge-generation and, less explicitly, change what's happened. Meacenas's argument presupposes not just the Hobbesian idea that within the context of state of nature, there is no justice, but a distinction between two kinds of judges (moralists/artists). Those that judge appropriately with authority (and force) and those that judge – for lack of a better word -- frivolously. By 'frivolous' (recall) I do not mean consequent-free; the novel is very clear that death (Cicero) and exile (Ovid) may well await frivolousness.

It turns out, however, that beyond judging with authority and judging frivolously, the novel explores another option for the philosopher-poet-historian: to "persuade because he has no power." (Horace to Octavius, (205)) In fact, part of persuasion is really two kinds of council. In context, Horace presents himself as a philosophical-poet who (1) teaches even absolute rulers (e.g., Octavius) the limits of legislation ("no law may adequately determine a spirit, nor fulfill a desire for virtue") as well as (2) educates mankind in "virtue." (We are not told how this fictional Horace meets 'Socrates's challenge' in Protagoras.) Obviously, the line between 'virtue' and what I have called 'propaganda' above may be slender. (Horace goes on to explain that despite his misgivings, he will "write the choral hymn for the celebration" of what he takes to be a bad law). Horace leaves unstated to what degree (1) can be inscribed into one's public art, or merely must remain council behind closed doors.

Of course, Williams teaches us that one can aim at (1) by means of a pretense—to write about a distant past, for example. And the mere fact of temporal extension reminds us that historians, poets/novelists, and philosophers write in time but not only for their own times, but also for future times and so that their instruction and cautious (yes!) judgments are also aimed at shaping their future reception. In the novel this is thematized both in terms of the publication of Virgil's Aeneid, in violation of the poet's last will and the emperor's promise (198), as well as in the last sentence (in a very ironic epilogue), where we are reminded of the powerful, enduring afterlife of Octavius's "dream" for Rome. For, it turns out, that while propaganda speaks of necessity, and the novel repeatedly points at the reality of epistemic indeterminateness (recall) -- even Augustus ends up acknowledging the god "Accident" (303) --, we also learn that some agents strive to help necessity along with all their ingenuity and might. Even if Augustus acknowledges that "the world is not poem" (303), and that even his impositions on the world do not achieve their desired end, his attempts were consequential. The implied contrast with, say, spiritless Stoner shocks.**

 

+In what follows I follow Williams's protagonists' equivocation of 'art' as applying to a variety of disciplines with a variety of techniques.

*In the sifting and shifting of evidence with a mixture of tacit and explicit taxonomic categories, moral judgments are unavoidable (even if the form of one's judgment is merely 'factural'). The real issue is to what degree one is self-ware of the moral judgments entailed by or presupposed in one's conceptual apparatus and to what degree one makes this explicit to one's readers.

**In a fature post I return to this issue because Augustus also explores the nature of love and this will help us better understand some of Williams's aims for Stoner and Augustus.

Comments

[Mark Behets]

As Miriam van Reijen clearly continues to point out: Spinoza was not a fatalist. Determinism does not imply that the outcome will be negative. But of course you know that Eric.

[Aaron Alvarez]

It seems a core point of the work is the creation of a ethical space that is created by council. This council is outside of a strict necessitarian causal chain. Even if we do not interpret Spinoza as a fatalist, an error I have made in the past, the issue still seems to be making a procession of neutral phenomena , a kinda base actuality open to things from the imagination. This is done not in the current moment but over time through the action of council that is determinant. This determination seems to be treated as a creative act, maybe a dialog?