Everybody, who understands the reasonings of both [mathematicians and philosophers] knows that the mathematicians, who following the rules of her science, have found many truths and have suffered fewer disputes about this than any other philosophers, who have followed a different path. No atheist [not even a follower of Spinoza--ES] can contradict this with the appearance of truth; in order to pass off his lamentable feelings for truths, Spinoza adopted the proof methods of geometry or mathemathematics in his Ethics in order to persuade the inexperienced with such superficial appearance.—Nieuwentyt (1720) Gronden van zekerheid,
Philosophy of science, as a distinct intellectual topic within philosophy, is parasitic on the existence of science. Science-like activity co-originates and coincides with the origins of Western philosophy in its mythological origins (think Thales). So, it stands to reason that there was some philosophy of science from the start; indeed we can discern in Plato and in Aristotle topics that we might label (even anachronistically) 'philosophy of science.' Throughout recorded history we find practitioners of the science that also engage in philosophical reflection on their own (and others') practice, or that articulate various epistemic and normative ideals, say, for the nature of scientific knowledge.
But if we understand 'philosophy of science' as a distinct, second-order intellectual enterprise that reflects on the nature, methods, presuppositions and aims (etc.) of science, then we're dealing with a relatively recent invention. I used to think, in fact, that it could only exist as a consequence of the institutional and methodological split(s) between philosophy and science. This split is commonly thought to be a nineteenth century event, although various disciplines become differentiated from philosophy at different times in different places in various institutions of higher learning.*
Some philosophy of science preceded the split between philosophy and science and, in fact, made it possible. To the best of my knowledge Bernard Nieuwentijt's posthumously published (1720) Gronden van zekerheid, of de regte betoogwyse der wiskundigen ...: ter wederlegging van Spinosaas denkbeeldig samenstel; : en ter aanleiding van eene sekere sakelyke wysbegeerte (that is the, "Grounds of Centainty; or the straight way of mathematical argumentation put together in order to refute Spinoza’s imagery combinations; and to promote a secure factual philosophy") is the first, distinct book of philosophy of science. As is clear from the title, it's written as a refutation of Spinoza. In particular, it's designed to show that despite the geometric method, Spinoza's work should not be conflated with, and receive the intellectual prestige of, the emerging mathematical sciences exemplified by Huygens and, especially, Newton throughout the book.
If Nieuwentijt (1654-1718), a physician and mayer of the small town of Purmerend (recall also here and here), is known at all it is for his criticisms of the foundations of Leibniz's calculus (not unlike Berkeley's criticism of Newton's fluxions). Leibniz and his school did not treat his criticisms with much respect; since Cauchy we know that the criticicisms were not without foundation.
The passage at the top of this post is the start of Nieuwentijt's book. Nieuwentijt uses 'mathematics' and its cognates for both pure math and mathematical science. (He makes a distinction between naked mathematics, which is about possible objects -- which need be capable of becoming concrete in our world --, and a factual mathematics, which is about objects in the world and their possibilities.) In the passage we can recognize four major themes that are elaborated in the boo:
- If you follow the proper (or right) rules you'll get to truth and (thereby) consensus
- Once you are in the possession of truth, you cannot (legitimately) be opposed.
- Cultivated (rule-following and measured) experience is required to get on the path of truth.
- In science there is no room for feelings.
These four features have become enduring aspects of an image of science, influential not just within philosophy (recall these posts on Hume and Williamson), but also the sciences themselves. An image of science contains (a) a list of characteristics that function as short-hand for representing science when (b) these characteristics are used in debates where one side (or more) appeals to the (epistemic) authority of science to settle debate, and (c) such an image is often accompanied by privileged list of scientific virtues.+ As an aside, it is not silly to associate Spinoza with feelings. As I learned from Noa Shein, feelings play a crucial role in the axiomatic structure of the Ethics (see especially Axioms 4 in Part 2, and the proof of the eternity of mind in part 5).
Now, I am not claiming that Nieuwentijt was the first to identify truth and consensus. Throughout the seventeenth century there are various programs of natural philosophy (Cartesian, Royal Society) that promote a conflict-free zone. For example, all four of Nieuwentijt's themes can be found in programmatic statements emanating from and defending the Royal Society. So, it is tempting to see in Nieuwentijt's book just a codification of existing practice; this is, in fact, how Nieuwentijt presents his position. Nieuwentijt's philosophy of science is grounded in his account of the practice of the sciences. Throughout the book he appeals to practices of (exemplary) scientists, Ancient and more recent. Of course, not all philosophy of science is philosophy of scientific practice (as is well known in the twentieth century there was a bias against focusing on practice within philosophy of science), but Nieuwentijt doesn't merely illustrate his positions with countless scientific examples he also likes quoting the pronouncements of eminent, authoritative scientists when they agree with his own position.
Crucially, while Nieuwentijt's preferred position has empiricist and fallibilist tendencies, his to-be-emulated exemplars cut across then-familiar divisions: Newton, Huygens, and Wolff are all praised. That is to say, consensus is not just a consequence of truth; in Nieuwentijt's image of science considerable consensus is presupposed in the norms and virtues associated with the practice of science (both in pure mathematics and empirical science). That is to say, from its start, philosophy of science as a self-standing enterprise inscribed exception-less-agreement as a key feature of its image science with the aim to leave no room for Spinozists in its future.
*There are further complications, of course, about philosophy's shift from a way of life to an academic subject.
+I characterize (b) as "Newton's Challenge to Philosophy" (see here and here).
**This, too, has a long pre-history, but the existence of enduring schools of philosophy from Ancient times prevent this image from becoming dominant. (Of course, theology often demands consensus in philosophy.)
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