Peaceful Hobbes

But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them down, with the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honour to risk their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant.--Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise (preface).

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention; which is to be understood by the end thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise, there is. Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice...When armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle is not injustice, but cowardice. But he that enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh impressed money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature, and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it without his captain's leave. And when the defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain. Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. 21.

It is often suggested that Hobbes advocates totalitarian or blind submission to the Sovereign. But when it comes to soldiering, Hobbes recognizes that we have a right to second-guess the Sovereign.

There is no doubt that Hobbes thinks all able-bodied have an obligation to fight in defense of the survival of the Commonwealth. Refusing to do so is a matter of injustice. But when it comes to wars of choice, however, one may well justly resist to join the armed forces, and leave the fighting to others that have voluntarily joined the armed service (for money or other reasons). That is to say, that unless the standing army is sufficient to meet the military needs of the Commonwealth, the Sovereign needs to make the case that some end is worth dying for. Obviously, the sovereign may always insist that this war is a war of survival (and attempt to punish refusal), but Hobbes clearly recognize that except of cases of obvious immanent dire threat, ultimately each citizen ought to make up his own mind about this. Despite the fact that Hobbes repeats the point in his conclusion, the significance of this is rarely recognized; (as Sreedhar notes) in crucial ways, Hobbes respects the (moral significance of the) independence of mind of citizens far more than contemporary political philosophers do.

At first glance, Hobbes also seems to think that the very same passion, fear (of death)* that induces people to contract into a commonwealth and stick to the laws is sufficient to make them fight on its behalf. Perhaps, this is indeed so when one's form of life is threatened by imminent destruction, but otherwise -- as Hobbes notices -- fear is really the wrong sort of passion: unchecked fear, may also cause desertion ("running away")  or disobedience. Hobbes does not explain how the sovereign can get people to die on his behalf either in defensive wars, when they are obliged to do so, or more offensive ones, when only professional soldiers are so obliged. (He does not advocate the use of religion for this purpose.) This is a welcome consequence of Hobbes's system; the very docility (Hobbes's timorousness) that the laws of the commonwealth generate, limits the scope of wars of choice and makes the Hobbesian Commonwealth surprisingly un-bellicose.

One might think that because in the quoted passage from ch. 21, Hobbes mentions "cowardice" and "dishonour," he thinks that in addition to fear of punishment, soldiers fight because of their courage and a desire for honor. As Hobbes says in Leviathan's conclusion, some souls can combine "courage for the war, and a fear for the laws." Now, there are two related problems here for Hobbes. First, it's clear that Hobbes think that few people are naturally courageous, let alone courageous in the right sort of way, so that they hanker after things that are "honorable by nature" (ch. 28). This is not to deny that, as I learned from Andrew Corsa, that Hobbes recognizes a rare species of courage that in well ordered souls, is the moral psychological ground for the social contract: "That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise." (Ch. 15) 

Second, Hobbes recognize that it is dangerous to promote courage by which Hobbes means "the contempt of wounds and violent death;" because courage "inclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace." It is especially dangerous to promote courage not just because it generates disturbances, but a courageous person feels powerful (see ch. 10). People that feel powerful (and that are talented and ambitious) are especially dangerous to the peace and stability of a commonwealth (see ch. 27).

In ch. 10, Hobbes also recognizes that people are able to overcome their fear of death and be courageous out of a sense of honor (which is just a species of power)--as the ongoing practice of (non-lawful) duelling shows. In fact, Hobbes's discussion of duelling shows his recognition of both the limits of (even draconian) law as well as (and simultaneously, thus) fear; duelling will only disappear once declining a duel is made honorable. So, from the vantage point of civic peace, a key task for the Hobbesian sovereign is to promote law-supporting honour ("badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereigns favour," (ch. 28)) without promoting so much courage and power that the stability of the law is undermined.

As Spinoza points out in the the introduction to the Theological Political Treatise, this is a delicate  matter because if one appeals to religion to generate the right sort of bloodthirsty honour, one also introduces permanent instability into the Commonwealth. To the best of my knowledge, Hobbes, who is aware that religion can promote such honour (ch. 34), does not spell out how to promote courageous and honor-loving soldier-citizens who are also willing to die for their country and that are not a threat to the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth is not threatened. This is no oversight; Hobbes's project is surprisingly un-imperial.+

 

 

*I do not claim fear is the only such passion; desire and hope also play a significant role. But fear is of crucial importance.

+I thank Johan Olsthoorn and Andrew Corsa for pointers on how to think about Hobbes in these matters.

Comments

[Michael Deckard]

It is worth reading Larry May, a famous philosopher of law, particularly regarding genocide and international law, who wrote a dissertation on Hobbes with Hannah Arendt (she died before he defended it) in which he defends a (contingent) pacifist reading of Hobbes in May's Limiting Leviathan. There is a good deal of literature on this worth taking seriously (my friend Patricia Springborg presented on this topic at a conference I helped organize in Sydney, Australia--she also defends a pacifist Hobbes).

[Eric Schliesser]

I know Larry's great paper on the social contract as a gift to a third party. But have not read his book yet. (We were colleagues once.)
Thanks for alerting me to the larger literature.

[Patricia Springborg]

Dear Michael, I have been trying to get hold of you but lost your email address when I moved from Bolzano to Berlin. Have you published your Sydney paper because I would like to acknowledge it. I am just now in the process of publishing mine! You can find my home page on the Centre for British Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin, website!

All the best
Patricia Springborg