The Role(s) of Formal Philosophers in Physicists Dissing Philosophers

One aspect of this situation is especially ironic. A philosophical reform movement [logical positivism--ES] instituted by a theoretical physicist [Mach-ES] to cleanse his own discipline philosophically, has succeeded alienating a sizeable proportion of the practitioners of that very craft from an interest in either philosophers or philosophical matters...A second problem involves the positivist language itself. Modern symbolic logic has itself matured into a discipline with highly developed systrem of techniques and processes. In order even cursorily to follow relevant discussions by modern logically-minded philosophers, scientists must become fluent in the symbolic language. Since they cannot be expected to do so, it becomes incument upon philosophers themselves to initiate and maintain communication and interaction...In fact, it appears that interest in logical analysis and other formal questions has quite isolated a sizeable segment of the philosophical community, keeping them from being concerned with issues that concern their scientific colleagues. As physicist James Cushing has noted, this sort of interest has introduced issues into the philosophy of science that do not occur in actual science. Thus, scientific questions which might once have been of interest no longer attract philosophers, in part because they lie outside current philosophical practice...But even more important is what has happened to professional philosophers as a result of the incricacies of the logical calculus they have adopted as an instrument. In effect, philosophers have been enticed away from the problems of interpreting science in order to focus on problems internal to the means of interpretation [of logic--ES] rather than the substance [of science--ES]."--George Gale (1984) in Nature.

A whole list of famous physicists (Hawking, Neil de Grasse Tyson, Dawkins, Krausse, etc.) have made dismissive remarks about philosophy in recent times. The has lead to robust discussion among informed philosophers, including a whole range of very sensible and judicious responses (e.g., Lewis Powell’s "Open Letter to Neil de Grasse Tyson," and Massimo Pigliucci’s "Neil de Grasse Tyson and the Value of Philosophy," reblogged at The Huffington Post; Wayne Myrvold and and Eric Winsberg NewAPPS). I would love to learn from somebody informed about the sociology of physics what role dismissing philosophy plays in physics and its current relationships to wider academy and society. But here I want to note that to the best of my knowledge only Wayne, an awe-inspiring good philosopher of physics, has commented on philosophy's contribution to the current state of affairs. Wayne makes sensible observations about the difficulty of getting dual degrees. But the following passage shows the hold of a fatal historical self-conception on even our very best:

Philosophy does carry with it a risk of getting bogged down in questions that are either pointless or meaningless, and it always has. There is, of course, a long tradition of philosophers saying just that. Insert your favourite examples here; my greatest hits list includes the resounding closing paragraph of Hume’s Enquiry, and Kant’s challenge to metaphysicians in the Prolegomena. The logical empiricists, of course, tried to demarcate between sense and nonsense in such a way as to keep science on one side and the sorts of pointless metaphysical disputes they wished to avoid on the other. Most philosophers these days think that there isn’t any simple way to draw a line between sense and nonsense. But that doesn’t mean that there’s no such thing as nonsense. Fill in your own favourite example of a dispute in contemporary philosophy that is either pointless or nonsensical.--Myrvold.

Note that in Wayne's potted history the "logical empiricists" are on the side of sense. Even if one grants that in their time the choices were morally courageous (recall my post on Glymour's manifesto a few days ago [see also Jeff Bell's post on Carnap/Heidegger]) and philosophically the least worst option on the table, one would wish for more critical reflection on where they took us. Luckily Gale sent me his 1984 piece after I posted on the abuses of formal philosophy a few days ago.

A key insight of Gale (ca 1984) was that by successfully making philosophy of science a professional enterprise with its own specialist, esoteric language and specialist problems technical philosophy of science marginalized itself within philosophy and disconnected from the sciences (in part, by too much focus on physics). This was coupled with a kind of anti-philosophical attitude that lingers in their heirs (cf. Wayne's "either pointless or nonsensical.") In his piece, Gale gives a nice example of this: he describes the ridicule he received from fellow philosophers of science (not cosmologists) after he published a piece on the anthropic principle (I assume he means this piece in Scientific American). Now that's a hot topic in philosophy, of course. So, rather than the rest of philosophy being responsible for the drift between physics and philosophy, maybe it's the largely 'pro science' philosophers of science that in succeeding in generating a decent professional niche within the intellectual and institutional division of labor, have some responsibility for the present state of affairs. 

As an aside, it's quite clear that until recently philosophy of science understood itself not just in contrast with the 'nonsense' produced by Continental philosophers, but also as a kind of secular enterprise. With the revival of Christian thought within analytical philosophy this cannot be taken for granted anymore. Recently I noticed an announcement of a grant award from the Templeton foundation to Oxford that mixes philosophy of science (questions of entanglement) with "the metaphysics of the incarnation and of the Trinity in philosophy of religion." That's the kind of thing that would have been met with public derision not so long ago; I have not seen a single public criticism of the project. The quiet is not just due to Templeton buying influence now and later; rather, philosophy is disengaging from a reflexive secularism. 

Okay, let me return to the main issue. The situation has, in fact, greatly improved since Gale's piece thirty years ago. Lots of philosophers of science engage with scientific practice and are in regular contact with scientists locally and professionally. So, I am hopeful that future generations of thought leaders in the sciences will have warmer feelings about philosophy (even if we can be individually annoying in our loveable ways). In particular, as it happens, European grant agencies have given formal philosophy of science a second-chance. For, as I remarked before, in the increasingly grant-driven environment of Europe, clustering in relatively specialized research clusters that can relatively easily fit the template of our modern scientific metrics pays off and can even produce philosophy congenial to (the rule-driven technocrats of) the Weberian state. The doubling-down on formal methods within philosophy is paying off in multiple ways: it is attracting talent, money, and critical mass in a number of European research centers (e.g., Munich, Groningen, Tilburg, Kent, Bristol, and my own Gent, etc.)*

It will be interesting to see if formal philosophy can avoid going down another cul-de-sac of the sort diagnosed by Gale a generation ago. As I pointed out earlier in the week, given the generality of formal methods (with topic neutrality as a regulative ideal), it is not obvious how one can cultivate philosophical good judgment or interdisciplinary significance. But if formal philosophy succeeds, perhaps, the next generation of physicists will renew their conversation with philosophers.

Okay, now I need to get back to my economists and philosophizing about them.

 

 

*Full disclosure: I have joined in setting up the Ghent Complex System Institute, which focuses on formal methods.

 

Comments

[S G Sterrett]

I'm a little surprised to read

"With the revival of Christian thought within analytical philosophy this cannot be taken for granted anymore. Recently I noticed an announcement of a grant award from the Templeton foundation to Oxford that mixes philosophy of science (questions of entanglement) with "the metaphysics of the incarnation and of the Trinity in philosophy of religion." That's the kind of thing that would have been met with public derision not so long ago; I have not seen a single public criticism of the project. The quiet is not just due to Templeton buying influence now and later; rather, philosophy is disengaging from a reflexive secularism."

I didn't think that the Templeton organization or its founder were associated with exclusively, or even mainly, Christian thought; cross-cultural studies in ideas he referred to as spiritual, yes. Nor did I think the Trinity was uniquely associated with Christianity, but imported into (only some) versions of it from elsewhere, perhaps ideas from the ancient Greeks. (Didn't Newton have some views on this?)

[David Jacobs]

Dawkins is a biologist, I believe.

[Eric Schliesser]

Thanks for catching that! Mea Culpa!

[Eric Schliesser]

I think the combination of incarnation and Trinity is distinctly Christian, but I welcome correction if I am wrong about that. Newton was, I think, an anti-Trinitarian and (I suspect) closer to Arianism.