I never said, that wild Beasts were design’d to thin our Species. I have shew’d, that many things were made to serve a variety of different Purposes; that in the Scheme of this Earth, many things must have been consider’d, that Man has nothing to do with; and that it is ridiculous to think, that the [261] Universe was made for our sake.--Mandeville, Fable of the Bees (vol 2), fifth dialogue.
Commentators have noticed that Mandeville appears to embrace providence in Volume 2 of the Fable. Even so, if we take him at face value, Mandeville's account of general providence is such that it is anti-anthropocentric--an anthropocentric conception would be not so much impious as "ridiculous." Newton had also argued for such an anti-anthropocentric conception of general providence in the General Scholium. But in context, Mandeville makes clear that he is underwhelmed by inductive arguments to design,* so if he has an argument for such general providence it will have to be distinct. He writes:
I would not make God the Author of Evil, any more than yourself; but I am likewise persuaded, that nothing could come by Chance, in respect to the supreme Being; and therefore, unless you imagine the World not to be govern’d by Providence, you must believe, that [262] Wars, and all the Calamities we can suffer from Man or Beast, as well as Plagues and all other Dis-[306]eases, are under a wise Direction that is unfathomable. As there can be no Effect without a Cause, so nothing can be said to happen by Chance, but in respect to him who is ignorant of the Cause of it.--Mandeville, Fable (vol 2), fifth dialogue.
If all effects have a cause (let's call this the 'causal principle,') and there is no such thing really as chance then there is either (a) a causal chain going back through 'eternity' or (b) God must have been the first cause. In context, Mandeville does not engage with (a). So, it seems he embraces (b) with what is known as 'skeptical theism' ("unfathomable"). But this being Mandeville, things are not straightforward. For surprisingly enough, after developing what causal determinism entails, he concludes his argument as follows:
It is evident then, that the Words fortuitous and casual, have no other meaning, than what depends upon our want of Knowledge, Foresight and Penetration; the Reflection on which will shew us, by what an Infinity of Degrees all human Capacity falls short of that universal intuitus, with which the supreme Being beholds at once every thing without Exception, whether to us it be visible or invisible, past, present, or to come. Fable 2, Fifth Dialogue.
If a word like 'cause' is ultimately an epistemic notion, then what is this "reflection" really going to show? For (b) relies on an ontological not epistemic interpretation of 'cause'. That God is all-knowing makes sense, if he exists. But to secure his existence, we need an ontological version of the causal principle. The situation gets even murkier in the Sixth Dialogue, where Mandeville introduces option (a) out of the blue:
As we our selves, and every thing we see, are the undoubted Parts of some one Whole, some are of Opinion, that this all,a the τὸ πὰν, the Universe, was from all Eternity.
Cleo.This is not more satisfactory or comprehensible, than the System of Epicurus, who derives every thing from wild Chance, and an undesign’d Struggle [312] of senseless Atoms. When we behold things, which our Reason tells us could not have been produced without Wisdom and Power, in a degree far beyond our Comprehension, can any thing be more contrary to, or clashing with that same Reason, than that the things, in which that high Wisdom and great Power are visibly display’d, should be coeval with the Wisdom and Power themselves, that contriv’d and wrought them? Yet this Doctrine, which is Spinosism in Epitome, after having been neglected many Years, begins to prevail again, and the Atoms lose ground: for of Atheism, as well as Superstition, there are different Kinds, that have their Periods and Returns, after they have been long exploded.--Mandeville.
So, not only is Mandeville aware of (a), recall the eternal causal chain, he claims to be familiar with arguments that have refuted it. But rather than offering those arguments, he suggests that it is one of those views that just recur regularly. He then goes on to say something extraordinary:
Yes, indeed; they both have their Rise from the same Cause, the same Defect in the Mind of Man, our want of Capacity in discerning Truth, and natural Ignorance of the Divine Essence. Men, that from their most early Youth have not been imbued with the Principles of the true Religion, and have not afterwards continued to be strictly educated in the same, are all in great Danger of falling either into the one or the other, according to the Difference there is in the Temperament and Complexion they are of, the Circumstances they are in, and the Company they converse with. Weak Minds, and those that are brought up in Ignorance, and a low Condition, such as are much exposed to Fortune, Men of slavish Principles, the Covetous and Mean-spirited, are all naturally inclin’d to, and easily susceptible of Superstition; and there is no Absurdity so gross, nor Contradiction so plain, which the Dregs of the People, most Gamesters, and nineteen Women in twenty, may not be [313] taught to Believe, concerning invisible Causes. Therefore Multitudes are never tainted with Irreligion; and, the less civiliz’d Nations are, the more bound-[375]less is their Credulity. On the contrary, Men of Parts and Spirit, of Thought and Reflection, the Assertors of Liberty, such as meddle with Mathematicks and natural Philosophy, most inquisitive Men, the disinterested, that live in Ease and Plenty; if their Youth has been neglected, and they are not well grounded in the Principles of the true Religion, are prone to Infidelity; especially such amongst them, whose Pride and Sufficiency are greater than ordinary; and if Persons of this sort fall into Hands of Unbelievers, they run great Hazard of becoming Atheists or Scepticks.--Mandeville.
What is this? If (i) we naturally lack the capacity of discerning truth, and (ii) have natural ignorance of the Divine Essence, then the only thing that can give us access to God's existence is indoctrination from childhood. It is, especially, striking that one is likely to be an atheist (i.e., Epicurean or Spinozist) if one has the means to be impartial and access to the best science ("of Parts and Spirit, of Thought and Reflection, the Assertors of Liberty, such as meddle with Mathematicks and natural Philosophy, most inquisitive Men, the disinterested, that live in Ease and Plenty.") So, it is no surprise that he claims (earlier in Fable 2) "that all true Religion must be reveal’d, and could not have come into the World without Miracle."
What, then, is "true religion?" Its content seems to be exhausted by commitment to "Creation out of nothing, the Unity and immense Greatness of that invisible Power, that has made the Universe," that is, at most a form of Deism. So, this entails that commitment to the causal principle ought to land one in (b), Spinozism or Epicureanism. A miracle reveals, however, creation out of nothing. So, a lot hinges on how we ought to take the evidence of the veracity of this miracle; stay tuned...
*In context he attacks a mathematical argument from differences in birth-rates among the sexes; in general, he is no fan of appeals to authority of mathematical sciences (recall here, and here).
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