Mandeville and Stoic Wisdom

This week and next week, I'll be part of some workshops (here and here) celebrating 300th anniversary of Mandeville's Fable of the Bees. At one point, Mandeville criticizes Seneca as follows:

I could swagger about Fortitude and the Contempt of Riches as much as Seneca himself, and would undertake to write twice as much in behalf of Poverty as ever he did, for the tenth Part of his Estate: I could teach the way to his Summum bonum as exactly as I know my way home: I could tell People that to extricate themselves from all worldly Engagements, and to purify the Mind, they must divest themselves of their Passions, as Men take out the Furniture when they would clean a Room thoroughly; and I am clearly of the Opinion, that the Malice and most severe Strokes of Fortune can do no more Injury to a Mind thus stript of all Fears, Wishes and Inclinations, than a blind Horse can do in an empty Barn. In the Theory of all this I am very perfect, but the Practice is very difficult; and if you went about picking my Pocket, offer’d to take the Victuals from before me when I am hungry, or made but the least Motion of spitting in my Face, I dare not promise how Philosophically I should behave my self. But that I am forced to submit to every Caprice of my unruly Nature, you’ll say, is no Argument that others are as little Masters of theirs, and therefore I am willing to pay Adoration to Virtue wherever I can meet with it, with a Proviso that I shall not be obliged to admit any as such, where I can see no Self-denial, or to judge of Mens Sentiments from their Words, where I have their Lives before me.--Fable, Remark (O), p. 151-2 in the Libertyfund edition [162-3].

There is no doubt that Mandeville is critical of moralists whose "practice" does not live up to their own preachings ("theory"). Seneca is unmasked as a hypocrite. Mandeville also clearly thinks that we ought to judge someone's character or virtue, not from (the appearance, that is) what he says, but from what he does.

But does it follow from this that Mandeville rejects Stoic virtue? One might think he agrees with "others that were no Fools neither, have exploded those Precepts as impracticable, call’d their Notions Romantick, and endeavour’d to prove that what these Stoicks asserted of themselves exceeded all human Force and Possibility, and that therefore the Virtues they boasted of could be nothing but haughty Pretence, full of Arrogance and Hypocrisy." (Fable) Given that 'ought implies can,' this could be a successful argument against Stoic virtue. But surprisingly enough, that's not Mandeville's position. His criticism of Stoicism is that "the practice is very difficult" not impossible, and so e writes: "I am willing to pay Adoration to Virtue wherever I can meet with it." Obviously, he does not expect to meet it very often.

So, consider this passage:

most of the ancient Philosophers and grave Moralists, especially the Stoicks, would not allow any Thing to be a real Good that was liable to be taken from them by others. They wisely consider’d the Instability of Fortune, and the Favour of Princes; the Vanity of Honour, and popular Applause; the Precariousness of Riches, and all earthly Possessions; and therefore placed true Happiness in the calm Serenity of a contented Mind free from Guilt and Ambition; [etc.--Mandeville]

I think the key word here is 'wisely.' This is an evaluative commitment amidst description. This is why he agrees that "the Virtuous are only capable of enjoying real Pleasures." But much of the book is not written from this theoretical perspective; the linguistic register that his Fable inhabits is, in fact, another one:

I expect to be ask’d why in the Fable I have call’d those Pleasures real that are directly opposite to those which I own the wise Men of all Ages have extoll’d as the most valuable. My Answer is, because I don’t call things Pleasures which Men say are best, but such as they seem to be most pleased with...

In the Fable, Mandeville is not interested in articulating how we could be, but in what our ordinary practices reveal about what most of us do find pleasing.* This turns out to have a further surprise. For Mandeville claims that when we encounter genuine examples of self-denial, "Mankind are very willing to take one anothers [sic] Word, when they see some Circumstances that corroborate what is told them; but when our Actions directly contradict what we say, it is counted Impudence to desire Belief." He then offers an empirical example of what we do, in fact, approve in others even if we cannot live up to it ourselves:

But when a Man from the greatness of his Soul (or an obstinate Vanity, which will do as well) resolving to subdue his Appetites in good earnest, refuses all the Offers of Ease and Luxury that can be made to him, and embracing a voluntary Poverty with Chearfulness, rejects whatever may gratify the Senses, and actually sacrifices all his Passions to his Pride in acting this Part, the Vulgar, far from contemning, will be ready to deify and adore him. How famous have the Cynick Philosophers made themselves, only by refusing to dissimulate and make use of Superfluities? Did not the most Ambitious Monarch the World ever bore, condescend to visit Diogenes in his Tub, and return to a study’d Incivility, the highest Compliment a Man of his Pride was able to make? [Fable]

So, the Stoics are wrong to think that "popular applause" is not available to a virtuous life!

Now, in treating of these matters, Mandeville often writes as if [A] "self-denial" is necessary for (true) virtue (e.g, "but I see no Self-denial without which there can be no Virtue"). This is Mandeville's rigorism. It's present in the passages I have quoted from Remark (O). But in these remarks there is also a substantive conception about [B] the nature of real Goods and real pleasures, that is, those that are not hostage to fortune and that can be properly said to be one's own. This is Mandeville's Stoicism. It's true that, in practice, [A] is psychologically prior to [B].

Mandeville sometimes appears to conflate [A] with [A*], that is, that virtue consists of self-denial. There is no doubt that Mandeville often deploys [A*] in dialectic with others as the purportedly agreed standard of virtue. But I think one can can endorse [B], as Mandeville does, without having to endorse [A*]; for, while Mandeville does endorse [A], I don't think he ever calls [A*] wise or true.