Let's talk about our professional norms

There’s a part of me that almost wants to say that if I would get penalized for exposing a serial sexual predator, then to hell with this profession. If I can’t succeed in this discipline because I did the right thing, then this is not the place I thought it was, and I wouldn’t want to be here anyway....Let’s think and talk about our norms...Let’s ask whether famous moral philosophers have a moral responsibility to live a minimally decent life. Let’s ask who would be the authority on what would count as a minimally decent life.--Anonymous.

The quoted lines are from a post [HT Feministphilosophers]*  that seems to have many aims, including (but not limited to): (a) a fishing expedition to obtain information that can aid a "legal case;" (b) to 'out' (if you can read between the lines) a well-known professional philosopher as not just as a serial (deceptive) cheat and sexual predator, but also to call attention to "the instances of sexual harassment he’s perpetrated;" (c) to warn other potential victims against this famous philosopher; (d) to expose "a rampant form of corruption in our discipline" in terms of sexual quid pro quos; (e) to destroy the profession's "culture of silence;" (f) to generate discussion on our professional norms; and more. Her post is a follow up to this one that I commented on here.

There is no doubt that professional philosophers are collectively, culpably negligent for the professional norms that have developed and that have created a permissive environment for sexual harassment and other egregious circumstances of "blurred lines." (The more powerful professional philosophers more so than the less powerful ones, etc.) We may not be solely responsible for these norms (society, religion, university administrators, etc.), but we have not done enough to change them. When I read the catalog of misdeeds experienced by anonymous and, worse, that she claims to have reliable testimony about, I feel shame and am ashamed for my community.

"To hell with this profession..."

 

All of us ought to live a minimally decent life. Undoubtedly, there are circumstances where we cannot do so. But professional norms and professional incentives are not worth having if they hinder the possibility to live a minimally decent life. I do not mean to suggest that professional norms should be thought of as obstacles to the minimally decent life; many professional norms may even facilitate virtues -- commitment to truth, love of justice, intellectual friendship, fair-play, receptivity toward alternative viewpoints, etc. -- that are indispensable on some decent paths of living.

Of course, there are conceptions of philosophy that are at odds with a commitment to (minimal) decency; those conceptions encourage flirtations with greatness, with transgression, even madness. They may even draw on the same veins of nobility that animate the virtues I mentioned in the previous paragraph. But these transgressive conceptions are incompatible with a professional ethos, so I set them aside in what follows.++

As I pointed out before, the dirty secret of professional philosophy is that one can make a fine career promoting justice in others. One professional consequence of this is that one has access to goods -- connections, letters of recommendation, grant/fellowship money, "job openings," access to publications, "cash," admission to graduate programs, foreign trips, and (that most scarce resource of all) time/availability, etc. -- that can facilitate other people's "career advancement" inside and outside the profession. I call these 'success goods.' [All the success goods I just listed are discussed in some fashion in anonymous' post.] One complicating factor here is that it is not always professional philosophers (and university administrators) that bestow access to these 'sucess goods' on professional philosophers. Interested and disinterested outsiders play a non-trivial role in this, too. The very idea of global justice is part of politics, after all. Either way, the existence of 'success goods' facilitate the possibility of corrupting our norms; there should be institutional ways to divorce professional recognition from (likely) abuse of such success goods.

One further possible problem, unmentioned by anonymous, is that the systematic dispositions (our intellectual reflexes) that are a consequence of contemporary professional philosophical training in what we professionals take to be the very best exemplars of philosophy may be corrupted by that very training (recall this post inspired by Ruth Chang). So, the fact that our norms facilitate (i) a conspiracy of silence and (ii) give professional power to some folk that can simultaneously corrupt the norms and prevent junior scholars from doing the right thing (and reasonable expect to remain in the profession), may -- even absent self-interested self-deception -- not be entirely visible to those most capable of setting in motion the changes required in the profession. Moreover, I suspect that some, who might otherwise be of better will, are not eager to facilitate a future in which we encourage anonymous accusations.

I really dislike the fact that in our profession arguments, including moral arguments, are treated as disembodied from moral character and lived experience; I think anonymity undermines the norm I would like us to inspire to. But I also recognize that others have not signed up for my norm and in a conspiracy of silence, anonymity may be the only live option.*** Either way, anonymous is right that we should talk about our professional norms because the status quo is harmful and generates systematic patterns of exclusion.

Anonymous is pointing the way toward professional codes of conduct for "famous moral philosophers," but by implication for all of us that have access to success goods in our professional capacity and that may be tempted to share them on the basis of sexual favors and to use such access as a means of control or violence. I would prefer we focus on ways of decoupling professional achievement from power over success goods. 

I now think about these matters in terms of the following five norms (which I collect under the rubric of 'analytical egalitarianism'):

1. Experts/philosophers can't keep themselves (their incentives/their roles, etc) out of the model/proposal. In practice this means that we can't simply assume that philosophers are disinterested truth-seekers in the context of policy.
2. Experts/philosophers shouldn't promote policies where the down-side risks of implementation are (primarily) shifted onto less fortunate others.
3. Experts/philosophers should make an effort to educate policy and opinion-makers to counter-arguments to the policies they advocate.
4. No professional norm should prevent members of the profession from being minimally moral.
5. The rhetorical and political standing of (a community of) experts/philosophers requires that their practices, especially among its most powerful and famous members, conform to the demands of justice.

In practice, of course, considerable and controversial contextual judgment is required in evaluating the suitability and content of these norms (which may involve a weighing of conflicting interests, etc.). The five norms will undoubtedly allow future abuse and, perhaps, generate new ones. But I encourage my peers that disagree with me to start articulating new norms for us and means toward attaining them.

the dirty secret of professional philosophy is that one can make a fine career promoting justice - See more at: http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2014/04/big-shot-ivy-league-professors-pretty-young-women-and-institutional-norms.html#more

 

*The author writes that "my identity is known to feminist philosophers," but it is unclear if this refers to the website, Feministphilosophers. In my previous post I allowed that this might be a hoax, but several people have assured me otherwise.

++In practice we recognize something like this; because many of us are more willing to allow exceptions to the existing (already lax) norms the closer the professional transgressor approximates perceived standards of greatness.

***I thank my facebook friends for helping me think about this; let me know if you wish credit here!

Comments

[David Wallace]

In conformity with norm (3), what would you say are the main counter-arguments to analytical egalitarianism?

[eric Schliesser]

Well, in the post, I suggest that there are conceptions of philosophy that deny the presuppositions of analytical egalitarianism. I also think it is an open empirical question if educating policy-makers to counter-arguments doesn't worsen the situation.
Does that help?