The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the examination of the works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against misery.--Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
If among supreme wisdom and gentleness are among God's perfections then we must be created for our happiness. We can't help avoid thinking that he is so wise and gentle, so our happiness must figure into the plan we attribute to him. Not unlike with other abstract arguments, Smith is underwhelmed by this abstract line of argument; he calls it an 'opinion.' On the epistemic scales common in the time, opinion falls short of probability, which falls short of proof, which, in turn, falls short of demonstration. (See Hume.) The confirming of an opinion by empirical evidence raises its status, perhaps, to a probability. It is, of course, possible to question if all the works of nature, once examined, really seem intended to promote happiness (etc.); are such seemings not in the eye of the beholder? Just a few lines down, Smith writes that "The natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavours of man: the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it; and though the rules which direct it appear to have been established for the wisest and best purposes, they sometimes produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments." This suggest that it sometimes may well take an effort to see how the works of nature "guard against misery."
The section I quote from is among the rhetorically most complicated in all of Smith's works.* In re-reading the abstract line of argument, I was struck by the inclusion of 'other rational creatures.' It raises two questions for me. First, who are other "rational creatures" mentioned? Are these angels or martians? Now, there is little evidence that Smith is (like, say, Locke) committed to a great chain of being and, so, angels. So, I suspect it's a reference to Martians (and other planetary beings in our solar system and elsewhere).
The idea of martians had become respectable (Fontenelle, Huygens, etc.) For example, in the General Scholium of the Principia, Newton argues that the beauty of our solar system is mimicked by countless other solar systems, too far apart to be of interest to us: ‘‘This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets, and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being. And if the fixed Stars are the centers of other like systems, these, being form’d by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One."
Many of Newton's most critical readers were thrilled by the idea that there might be life on other planets. In the first edition of the Principia, Newton had claimed ‘‘Therefore God placed the planet at different distances from the sun so that each one might, according to the degree of density, enjoy a greater or smaller amount of heat from the sun’’ (Book 3, proposition 8, corollary 5; I am quoting from the Cohen-Whitman translation, 814). As Bernard Cohen argues, Huygens saw the implications of the argument while commenting on proposition 8 that it showed what kind of gravity ‘‘the inhabitants of Jupiter and Saturn would feel’’ (219; despite the removal of the proposition in later editions of the Principia Kant also saw the point (Universal Natural History, Part 2, section 2, 284–85 (271; for more on this see here)).
Second, does the abstract argument require that we are rational? (By 'require' I do not mean, in the sense that reason is required to think it.) That is, is it because we (take ourselves to be or we) are rational that God intends our (and other rational creatures') happiness? Why does our reason secure the links among God's plan, his infinite attributes, and our happiness? If God's infinite benignity secures any happiness, it secures happiness for all his creatures. For example, when Smith is very clearly speaking in his own voice, he claims that:
Fellow-feeling which Nature has, for the wisest purposes, implanted in man, not only towards all other men, but (though no doubt in a much weaker degree) towards all other animals. Having destined him to be the governing animal in this little world, it seems to have been her benevolent intention to inspire him with some degree of respect, even for the meanest and weakest of his subjects. ("Of the External Senses" 6, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, 136)+
Let's stipulate that if God exists, then Nature's wisest purposes can be attributed to God's intentions or infinite attributes. So, then God's infinite goodness, would have to have all creatures' happiness in mind. Now, admittedly, respect and happiness are not the same. And one can obtain and offer respect without expecting happiness along the way. But, presumably, by respecting weaker creatures the weaker have more of a shot at their happiness. So, I am pretty confident that Smith rejects the abstract argument.
*I have argued elsewhere that at the most fundamental explanatory level Smith rejects providential, final causes. But nothing rides on it here.
+ Note that Smith's confines our government to "this little world"--the other planets are off-limits. Patrick Frierson has done important work on developing these remarks into a Smithian environmental ethics.
Comments