What is perhaps needed is a deeper and more fundamental change, a reconceptualization of the nature of philosophical inquiry and practice.--Samir Chopra
[T]his pursuit [i.e., philosophy], not only in the eyes of good men, but also in the eyes of those who are even moderately bad, is a sort of protecting emblem...philosophy is peaceful and minds her own business. [One] cannot scorn her; she is honoured by every profession, even the vilest among them. Evil can never grow so strong, and nobility of character can never be so plotted against, that the name of philosophy shall cease to be worshipful and sacred.--Seneca (Letter 14).
Yesterday, I skipped these lines out of a kind of embarrassed discomfort. But Chopra's post has made me reconsider. Let's stipulate, for the sake of argument, that Seneca's ideal is not mere wishful thinking, but a live possibility.
Much has changed since Seneca's Letters. Here are four notable features:
- (i) A religion infused with (speculative) philosophy became state religion in lots of places for nearly two millenia.
- (ii) Philosophy and its scientific-offspring allied itself with warmaking tacitly and explicitly.
- (iii) Philosophy became the hand-maiden to several ideologies that serve the modern state -- perhaps itself a philosophical bastard -- faithfully.
- (iv) Philosophy can be a (moderately) lucrative career in a whole variety of modern institutional settings.
Obviously, (i-iv) are not disconnected phenomena. Leaving aside their historical and philosophical connections, they all create a context in which philosophy stops being peaceful and mind her own business. Now, Seneca is aware that Socrates, Plato, and Cato (etc.) all thought that philosophy has some public role to play (in, say, promoting justice, better laws, expertise, promote freedom, less superstition, etc.). But absent (i-iv), the harms that could follow from philosophy are fairly mild. By contrast, in the presence of any one among (i-iv), the harms can be considerable. That is to say, once the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of power are allies then corruption away from Seneca's ideal is -- given human nature -- inevitable. Obviously, I have given no argument for this latter claim, which begs the question against a potential institutional design that can marshall power in the service of truth without serious harms. I am unfamiliar with such a design.
As an aside, even if one were to grant that sometimes philosophy has been corrupted in serious ways, one might think after cost-benefit analysis that the benefits to philosophy have and continue to be worth it since, say, Descartes or Bacon embraced -- inspired by Machiavelli and More -- variants of (ii-iv). Undoubtedly, many just causes may be promoted by affiliation with social strength. And there is no doubt that philosophy has had access to once unthinkable resources.
Recently a number of informed commentators have noted that professional philosophy's problems with inclusiveness, sexual harassment, and its embarrassing record of hostility toward minorities in its midst may well be connected with the way in which certain topics have high status within the profession and the ways in which the profession conducts its 'business.' (See, for example, Chopra's post that I quoted above and this related one.) If incentives matter, and I think they do, then philosophy's complicity with social and professional injustices, small and large, is not incidental--they are structural consequence of the institutions in which it (willingly) functions. This is not to deny that one can reform some of the institutions and make them more inclusive/just (etc.), but it also suggests that part of professional philosophy's problem is itself a consequence of being a profession. This is not meant to hinder attempts at reform, but we should also not be blind to the fact that ultimately professional philosophy has limited control over its own incentives.*
To be clear, professional philosophy is a varied beast--we operate in different institutional environments and the excesses these produce are often local in character (even if North American philosophy has a relatively out-sized weight in the profession).
So, can philosophy return to Seneca's ideal? Not, as a profession. Perhaps, there are people that are regenerating philosophy outside of institutions (ii-iv). The problem is that technical developments within philosophy have made it much harder for an outsider to contribute--there are now non-trivial barriers to entry; not to mention that it is very hard to compete with an advanced division of intellectual labor that has embraced some variety of scientific philosophy.
My own tentative suggestion is to decouple philosophy from the pursuit of truth.** It's not that professional philosophy should be an enemy of the truth or hostile to it. Even so, I have come to think that our focus on truth gives us a (tacit) status quo bias.*** Our task for philosophy should be to generate concepts that make our current institutions obsolete one day by making overlooked experiences visible and by these (concepts) to improve the possible experiences of others and ourselves. That is, I propose that our task is conceptual legislation. And so, I mark the second month anniversary of this blog.
*Brian Leiter's Gourmet report is an attempt to take some such control and diffuse the benefits widely. For all the genuine benefits it has brought to prospective graduate students, the upward push on average salaries for a whole class of professors (as a consequence of competitive bidding), and the widening of parts of philosophy (especially historical areas), it also has some lamentable consequences, including most obviously promoting lack of receptivity toward the un-ranked and un-rankable (and, thus, unthinkable). While one could certainly improve on some of the mechanisms for ranking as such (and, perhaps, remove how Leiter's vision has shaped it), one will not be able to eliminate all the consequences to philosophy of what is effectively a zero-sum instrument. But giving up on such an expert ranking means giving up on some autonomy for the profession.
**That is, truth as understood post-Tarski.
***Clearly this statement needs a lot more argument, especially because some folk might well believe that their focus on justice minimizes or eliminates the risks I hint at.
I disagree with the main contention, that philosophy should decouple from the pursuit of truth. If I've learned anything from scholarship in implicit bias, I've learned this: Philosophers are wrong, quite wrong, in a truth-dependent way, that they are transparently rational, objective, as they confidently stride around making their grand armchair claims correctly. This isn't a problem with the commitment to truth. This is a problem with a commitment to an interest in seeing oneself as right and good, which is not true and which is, instead, false. Philosophers, the persons, should decouple their pursuits from their self-images as smart right people. Pursue the truth, colleagues. Don't be so invested in your reflection.
Posted by: Kate Norlock | 03/09/2014 at 11:59 PM
Kate, your logic is impeccable.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/10/2014 at 12:05 AM
I'd like to understand Eric's post (and Kate's comment) better by distinguishing between at least two different ways in which philosophers pursue the truth: (1) Philosophers formulate philosophical questions (questions that arise out of tensions between inconsistent beliefs/experiences) and develop and test possible answers/solutions/resolutions to those questions. (2) Philosophers examine their own methods of inquiry to see whether or not they are truth-conducive.
If I understand Eric correctly, he argues that we should decouple (2) from pursuit of truth because "our focus on truth gives us a (tacit) status quo bias". This leaves open the possibility that he and Kate agree that pursuit of truth is not problematic (at least not for the same reasons) in task (1). If I understand Kate correctly, she argues that pursuit of truth in task (1) is sidelined/warped when we hyper-focus on task (2) rather than pursuing (2) only in the service of (1). I'd like to understand both points more thoroughly, so I look forward to continued discussion in this comment thread.
Posted by: Kaija Mortensen | 03/10/2014 at 03:21 PM
Eric, I would like to first say that I enjoy and admire your blog writing. In your blog voice you seem to have your finger on the pulse of something important, and thanks for following that pulse publically.
That said, I am not sure about philosophy (professional or not) decoupling from the concept of truth. How would doing that help with, for example, increasing the number of black academic philosophers? It is not as if black philosophers don't care about truth. Or is it that when black philosophers care about truth they are unwittingly limiting their own progress in the profession? That seems hard to believe.
I would think it is impossible for people on the margins to forgo the concept of truth, because they would then lose the only way available to them to show that they speak not just with a marginal voice, but with a universal voice. So if people within the power structures forgo the concept of truth, they actually make it hard for people on the margins to show their universal voice and so their marginalness is tacitly reaffirmed.
Posted by: Bharath Vallabha | 03/10/2014 at 03:43 PM
Kaija, I like your formulation in (1; except for the 'test' stuff), but that's because it is focused on discovering tensions/inconsistencies in our experiences. Alas, that's not how I more regularly hear philosophy conceived; rather it gets presented as a discipline that inquires into what is (the truth). I much prefer to think of philosophy as the discipline that reflects on what could (and should) be.
I should let Kate speak for herself on the other part of your comment(s)!
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/10/2014 at 04:43 PM
Bharath, thank you for your kind comments.
First, I did not mean to be speaking to what works in reform projects (of the sort that Samir Chopra recommends). (As I put it in the post: ("This is not to deny that one can reform some of the institutions and make them more inclusive/just (etc.).)
Second, I am not suggesting that everybody should forgo the concept of truth--rather I am suggesting that professional philosophy should do it in its self-understanding. I certainly do not wish to be advising or speaking on behalf of "people on the margins!"
I hope that helps
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/10/2014 at 04:49 PM
Eric: I, too, much prefer to think of philosophy as the discipline that reflects on what could (and should) be. You assert that professional philosophy should forgo the concept of truth in its self understanding. Could you please say more about how conceiving of ourselves as pursuing the truth enforces a (tacit) status-quo bias? How does conceiving of ourselves as pursuing the truth prevent us from being self-critical?
Posted by: Kaija Mortensen | 03/10/2014 at 05:16 PM
It's a fair demand Kaija.
On the first: I think the methods we have available within philosophy and social science are not fully capable of evaluating alternative institutions that we might inhabit--rather they take existing institutions (tacitly) for granted. (I blog more regularly about this in my philosophy of economics and the political economy of science contexts.)
I am not claiming that pursuing the truth prevents us from being self-critical an sich; rather the self-criticism tends to stop short of calling the basic institutions into question.
But I agree that all of this demands much more elaboration--some of which in progress during the last few years at NewAPPS and now at D&I.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/10/2014 at 05:34 PM
i don't think you need to be persuaded by nietzsche re what the will to truth is, to be persuaded by his middle-period ('meditations' to 'gay science') insistence upon seriously asking about the value of truth. and the broad extension he tends to give to 'history' at some points, like in 'utility and liability of history for life' (as if any properly contemporary pursuit of knowledge will have accepted that the things to be known are phenomena with histories, and that potentially all phenomena, thus belonging to 'history', become relevant to such a voracious appetite for knowledge as modern universities have), at least leaves room for the elaboration of a kind of affective economy of knowledge-pursuit, with different modes of being, different individual and social uses for knowledge (figured in the 'monumental', 'antiquarian', and 'critical' modes of doing history).
eric, i am more curious about the alternative which you describe and then name 'conceptual legislation'. is there not just as much, or more, of a problem of authority there as there is one of truth? (why not instead, for like purposes, call it 'conceptual authorship'? a poesis for thinking.)
Posted by: j. | 03/10/2014 at 05:56 PM
Whatever problem I might have with the classical ideal of truth, it's not a problem of authority.
I will have to reflect on your other comments.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/10/2014 at 06:02 PM
Eric, you seem to be saying the following. When professional philosophers think what they are doing is pursuing truth, they become oblivious to certain institutional structures they are a part of. This is because the self-understanding of pursuing truth creates a self-image that because one is pursuing truth one is not driven by issues of power, vanity, historical privilages, etc. So the way to become better aware of these institutional structures is to give up the self-understanding of pursuing truth.
Perhaps this point applies generally. If a person in a relationship think they are acting out of love, and if they also assume that acting out of love is the opposite of trying to control one's partner, then their affirmations of love can actually become a way to suppressing in oneself and in the relationship facts of the power dynamics in the relationship.
In the relationship case, would the way to become self-aware of the power dynamics and so be open to new possibilities be to forgo the self-understanding of loving each other? Seems not. Creating new possibilities is hard and draining, and it requires a joint self-understanding which can withstand the difficulties. Love is such a self-understanding in relationships. I think truth as a self-understanding of philosophy works similarly. It can bring and hold people together, even when the differences between philosophers threaten to break the connections which bind them.
What is to be avoided is not, as a generality, truth as a self-understanding of philosophy. But rather an indiscriminate use of such a self-understanding, which stifles conversations of bringing out differences. The philosopher who, when feeling threatened by change, keeps repeating "but we all care about truth" is like the person in the relationship, who when confronted by his partner, keeps saying, "but we love each other". Of course, they might love each other, just as all philosophers might care about truth. But sometimes it is better to show the self-understanding by being willing to change, than to keep saying the self-understanding as a way to protect oneself from the change.
Posted by: Bharath Vallabha | 03/10/2014 at 06:17 PM
sorry, i was thinking instead that many of the issues having to do with (especially professional, insitutionalized) philosophy's relation to the world vis-a-vis truth have parallel instances vis-a-vis authority. not that there is some clear problem of authority to be had with the classical ideal of truth. and since you work so much on political economy, etc. i should specify, i'm thinking mostly of something like 'the authority of reason', the authority with which the philosopher speaks (which if i gather correctly you would have read about specifically in abe stone's paper on the meno?).
Posted by: j. | 03/10/2014 at 06:21 PM
Bharath, I like your attempt at characterizing my stance. But I am not persuaded by your response.
Relationships takes place within an institutional context (law, religion, the economy); these constrain the option-space for any individual pair (trio, etc.) such that it is convenient short-hand and just to talk about individual effort and outlook when trying to repair/fix/deepen (etc.) the relationship. If you want to take all of that for granted, sure.
So, I don't think that truth necessarily brings philosophers together--that depends on incentives and institutional context (and other norms, practices). I see little evidence for the claim that truth is even likely to bring philosophers together.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/11/2014 at 08:06 AM
I have little anxiety over the authority (of reason) or with which I speak.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/11/2014 at 08:09 AM
Eric, yes, law, economy, religion, etc. are the contexts in which a relationship takes places. And yes, love is not one more context, as if it can be set along side these institutional contexts. That is the mistake of the person who responds to the partner, "but we love each other", as if the abundance of love can make up for, say, disparities in the relationship. Instead, love is the commitment of the people in the relationship to continually rethink and be open to change regarding the material and social contexts of the relationship.
I think truth works similarly in a professional context. When, say, a professor is talking to a grad student, they are engaged in the pursuit of truth not independent of the context of the power dynamics they are within, as if pursuing truth is a special kind of social context which is independent of and makes up for the obvious disparities in their social situations. Rather, the pursuit of truth is their shared commitment to rethink their social and material contexts. So when there is real openness to change on both sides, what they do together can rightly be called pursuing the truth.
The main obstacle to institutional change in academia is the feeling that all this social equality stuff is orthogonal to the main day job of finding truth, which it is assumed requires keep on keeping on with most of the established procedures. I think change requires changing this way of thinking of truth, which basically is an institutionalized way of letting people off the hook. This is how I hear your claim that you see "little evidence for the claim that truth is likely to bring philosophers together." Yes, if truth is interpreted as something orthogonal to social change. Though truth can bring people together if the intrinsic connection between truth and social change is better appreciated.
Posted by: Bharath Vallabha | 03/11/2014 at 03:55 PM
Well, Bharath, my claim is, in part, (in your terminology) that the incentives and norms that exist in professional philosophy prevent better appreciation of a connection between truth and social change. So, it seems strange to say that we need a changing the way of thinking of truth if you don't have a way to block the existing incentives and norms.
Given that I do not see how to block those, I am offering an alternative approach.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/11/2014 at 09:42 PM
Eric, that's an interesting point. Definitely any attempt at institutional change has to deal with the incentive structures and norms, or at least cannot ignore that.
Posted by: Bharath Vallabha | 03/12/2014 at 07:40 PM