On Descartes' reasons

And the example of many excellent minds who had a plan before them, and who seemed to me not to have succeeded, made me imagine so much difficulty that perhaps I still would not have dared to undertake it if I had not seen that some people had started a rumor that I had already arrived at my goal. I did not know on what they based this opinion; if I contributed something to it through my conversations, it must have been by confessing to what I did not know more ingenuously than is usual for those who have a bit of learning, and also perhaps by making known the reasons for my doubting many things which others took to be certain, rather than by boasting of any doctrine. But being sufficiently good-natured so as not to want to be taken for anything other than I was [Mais ayant le coeur assez bon pour ne vouloir point qu'on me prit pour autre que je n'étois], I thought it essential to try, by all means, to be worthy of the reputation  that was given me...--Descartes, Discourse on Method, Third Part, translated by Olscamp.

Let's stipulate that as reasons go,  this is an excellent one to justify moving to Holland.

Descartes undertakes the "search for the principles of any philosophy more certain than the common variety" in order to be worthy of the reputation he has mistakenly acquired. This is a form of pride. Descartes does not really like pride, so it would be surprise if he would endorse it on his own behalf. In a different context, Adam Smith helpfully describes the pride that Descartes here exhibits as "the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters," (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 3.3.5.4, 137). That is to say, this comes close to what Descartes would call 'generosity,' except that it is crucial to Cartesian generosity that it involves at least some orientation toward the good of others.

Of course, here is no doubt that indirectly, having the principles of philosophy will have lots of socially beneficial consequences (in medicine, especially). But that's not what is motivating Descartes here. Rather it is a feature of his own character: that he wishes to be taken for what he truly is: a really good heart. Now, I am unsure what to call (a) Descartes' understanding of himself as a really good heart (if he had called himself 'great souled,' then sure) and (b) the wish to be taken for what one truly is. I welcome readers' suggestions (both on what Descartes would say about (a-b), and what we ought to say about it).

Now, recall that philosophic prophecies conceptualize a merely possible, even improbable, situation and evoke behavior that makes the original conception come out true, or approximately true. Strikingly, having a false reputation, which is unknown to be false, ensures that -- given who Descartes is -- Descartes wishes to make the reputation come out true. By his own lights Descartes succeeds and is, thus, a philosophic prophet.

Comments

[Alan Nelson]

I like this analysis given the stipulation that we are to take what D says here as a straight, true account of his motivation.
Given the full theory of the passions, however, we needn't try to get "close" to generosity via pride. -Passions- #153 defining generosity is preceded in #152 with a connection between wisdom and good reasons for self-esteem. So "using one's will well" (generosity), i.e. willing what one carefully judges to be best. So for D, it is generous to pursue the advancement of human knowledge.

This does seem like a good example of your concept of philosophical prophecy. (Setting aside the oddness of the quoted text itself being retrospective).

[Eric Schliesser]

Yes, Alan, I agree that there is no doubt that for Descartes it is generous to pursue the advancement of human knowledge (in more way than once), but I still find his expressed motivation in the quoted passage, well, peculiar.

Philosophical prophecy often entails a variety of oddness.:) I am very pleased, of course, that you like this purported example.

[George Gale]

If I'm reading you right here, Eric,
wouldn't (accurate) philosophical prophecy be a species
of self-fulfilling prophecy?

[Eric Schliesser]

Close. There is indeed a family resemblance between the two (and I discuss this in my paper). But in self-fulling prophecies an initially false claim turns out to be true, while in philosophic prophecy an initially implausible/improbable claim becomes true. (It cannot be knowingly false.)