How I Learned to Love Derrida by Talking to An Economist (I), [No, Not Paul de Man, too.]

[Due to a technical problem with Typepad this could not post yesterday.--ES]

"one cannot usefully say "I love you" in mathematical language"--Paul Samuelson (1965) Foundations of Economic Analysis, new foreword. (Quoted in Khan 1993: 795.)

Beginning as it did in the writings of philosophers, theologians, pamphleteers, special pleaders, and reformers, economics has always been concerned with problems of public policy and welfare. And at least from the time of physiocrats and Adam Smith there has never been absent from the main body of economic literature the feeling that in some sense perfect competition represented an optimal situation.—Paul Samuelson (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis, Chapter VIII. (Quoted in Khan 1993: 787)

In Samuelson’s second passage, philosophy belongs to the disreputable far origins of economics (“special pleaders” is not a compliment). It’s an origin that is not wholly overcome in these mathematical and scientific Foundations, for a part of economics is continuous both with the far origins and its more recent origins ca 1750-76 (that is, “the time of physiocrats and Adam Smith”). Samuelson (an early Nobel in economics), who was not only the most influential mathematical economist within economics of the twentieth century, but also a first-rate historian of economics, is aware, of course, that the economist, Smith, is a philosopher not devoid of theoretical interest in feeling within the economy and (echoing Hume) in theorizing about the economy as well as even in theorizing about the social practice of theoretical reflection on the economy. For Samuelson, the continuity is topical (exhibited in concern with “problems of public policy and welfare”) as well as doctrinal (perfect competition represents an optimal situation).* Samuelson presupposes that what mathematical economics is about is wholly distinct from the mathematical language deployed in representing it. In his commentary on Samuelson, Khan, who does not deny the continuity, challenges this form-content distinction in mathematical economics.

Part of Samuelson’s achievement is to move away from feeling and articulate very precise circumstances in which perfect competition is an optimal situation. (To be clear, these circumstances occur in a model-world or representation; here I ignore their way of being, but it is their odd status that generates Khan's challenge.) In doing so, Samuelson manages to make economics something distinct from philosophy (a process initiated, perhaps, by Sigdwick and Marshall in the late 1880s) while remaining continuous with it. For the friends of Thomas Kuhn: Samuelson creates the paradigmatic normal economic science--a concern by many of his generation (see here). As Samuelson puts it in his 1965 foreword: his work is "part of the dawn, [with] serious economics a mathematical subject, just as physics...had become a century ago." Surprisingly enough, Samuelson’s achievement does not eliminate concern with problems of public policy and welfare within philosophy (reviving this, is part of Rawls’ achievement).

For the sake of argument, I stipulate that after Samuelson (i) economics is a science (and I use ‘economics’ and ‘science’ and their cognates interchangeably in what follows) [but see here, here, here]. I also stipulate that, after Samuelson (ii) philosophy is something distinct from economics not just institutionally, but also in its content (cf. Rawls).** So, that, say, a philosopher with an interest in scientific practice can observe economics in order to make philosophical claims about a privileged decision theory or say, social ontology or the political economy of science(s) and philosophy (in order, say, to be reflexive about one’s philosophy). Such a philosopher may even wish to tease out philosophical presuppositions of science(s). The philosopher finds science in textbooks, journal articles, and a whole variety of practices. It’s, of course, not necessary to talk to any scientist in order to be a philosopher of economics. But given that one is investigating what other people do with words, with mathematics, and a whole variety of instruments (in the context of a fine-grained division of labor and a large number of institutions), one might also engage with economists (in order, say, to understand their perspective on their activities or to gain access to their specialist knowledge about their activities).*** So, one may well expect to find philosophical doctrine (perhaps hidden) in economics.

 

As an aside, there are lots of other roles that science can play in philosophy: (a) it can be a source of discipline in one’s philosophy (as Timothy Williamson thinks); (b) it can be a constraint on one’s philosophy (in line with many so-called 'naturalists'); (c) it can be a baseline from which the philosopher prepares the grounds for the next post-revolutionary science (as Michael Friedman argues); (d) it can provide one with methodological exemplars on how do to philosophy (as scientific philosophers hope); (e) it can be a trump-card to end philosophical dispute (Newton’s Challenge). Obviously, lots of combinations of these roles are possible, too. (For a different list see here.)  

When I started to do philosophy of recent economics I did not expect to find scientists with philosophies; I certainly did not expect to be taught philosophy from the folk I studied. To be clear: I was keen on avoiding applying inherited philosophy to economics; so I did not want to apply, say, the realism/antirealism debate to economics, or wonder if economic theory can be falsified. Rather I expected to develop philosophical concepts and questions appropriate to the material at hand. But with hindsight it’s no surprise that I would bump into ‘local informants’ with an interest in philosophy—that is, if you are an economist, talking to Schliesser presents an opportunity cost unless you happen to want to talk to a philosopher anyway. Now, once I realized that some economists were eager to talk to a philosopher, I naturally assumed that these would want (x) to learn about philosophy or, perhaps, (y) learn more about Schliesser's philosophy. I have been of some limited use to some scientists with an interest in (x). But on the whole most economists that I have talked to have been (z) eager to discuss their philosophical views with me. So, in the trading zone that we created they give me their understanding of economics and in return I give them (ahum) my attention for their philosophies.

Now, among the scientists that are eager to talk to philosophers few are trained professional philosophers. Even the ones that we qua philosophers respect most (recall this list) or that have joint appointments in, say, economics and philosophy, tend to express themselves in ways that mark them off as non-professional-philosophers. (Sometimes the true hybrid economist-philosophers are also distinctly different from the economist qua economist.) So, when one first encounters the writings of an economist with a genuine interest in professional philosophy or talking to a philosopher, one will be inclined to think that one is encountering inferior philosophy. (I leave aside the anti-philosophical scientists or the ones that use philosophy as ideology.) But in practice most professional philosophers will react with a certain amount of indulgence; after all, we are secretly quite pleased if others wish to be philosophical (especially if they are suitably deferential to our expert opinion—as we would be about theirs, of course.) Vanity works in funny ways. We certainly do not expect such an economist to know of recent breakthroughs; so upon reflection, one expects to encounter somewhat dated philosophy.

Things get a lot more dicey when the economist with an interest in philosophy appeals to philosophers that one finds disreputable. Not just in the sense that, say, Robert Pirsig is far outside the contemporary professional philosopher’s line of vision, but rather in the sense that Derrida and Paul de Man are held in active, ongoing contempt within one’s professional education and environment. In particular, one such economist, Khan, leans on Derrida to argue in an an extended reflection on Samuelson's Foundations that (quoting Jameson) “only in the highest art are idea and representation adequate to each other.” (767)**** If we grant Samuelson that his representation is adequate to the idea he articulates, then, by the law of identity, Samuelson’s economic science is also the highest art.

Now, even if opaque to some, the words in the previous paragraph are not nonsensical. In particular, the idea that a scientific-revolutionary-paradigm-legislator is in some sense engaged in the highest art is not alien to, say, a perspective that (i) embraces the very possibility of scientific revolutions (however continuous with the pre-paradigmatic stage(s) that precedes it) and (ii) that believes that concept formation/innovation is constitutive of philosophy. Strikingly enough, Khan – a mathematical economist at Hopkins -- appeals to Derrida's "distinction between a cornerstone and a keystone" in order to explain and articulate crucial features of the nature of what we would call the normal, post-revolutionary development of mathematical economics since Samuelson. This is not the place to report what I learned about economics through Kahn's use of Derrida; rather, I learned that by reflecting on Khan’s example that Derrida could serve legitimate even important philosophical uses for at least one economist-practitioner.+ (Khan has also taught me to appreciate resources within Oakeshott, who, while not as disreputable as Derrida, was certainly not mentioned with approval in the circles I frequent.) Before long I will reflect on the possibility that Derrida's frivolity may be indispensable to Khan’s project in opposition to Samuelson's seriousness (recall above).

But I have rambled on long enough. So, by being receptive to an economic theorist's reflections on his  activity, and regular experiences like it with many other economists, I was taught that I can learn about philosophy's past and what philosophy (and our joint future with economics) can be. Along the way, I learned to love Derrida. 

 

 

*We all know the significant role of such continuity claims in discipline formation.

**That is (i-ii) are not an eternal truths. (I am often struck by the family resemblances of the practices within economics and philosophy, especially in their gendered intra-politics.)

*** One may even be committed to a methodological constraint familiar from analytical egalitarianism such that if one writes about other people, these ought to have (some) say in the matter.

****I leave aside if ‘adequacy’ here should be understood in its Humean or Spinozistic (or some alternative) sense.

+When I first read Khan’s essay, I was unfamiliar with HJ Rheinberger’s important work on experimental systems.

Comments

[John Protevi]

Very, very interesting post. And I'm saying that not simply because it validates my instinct that Derrida's work should be brought in from the cold.

Just a small point: am I correct that the following shows your training as a historian of philosophy? "I was keen on avoiding applying inherited philosophy to economics; so I did not want to apply, say, the realism/antirealism debate to economics, or wonder if economic theory can be falsified. Rather I expected to develop philosophical concepts and questions appropriate to the material at hand."