The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.—John Maynard Keynes.
David Hume, who to this day is known as 'le Bon David' and a nice guy within philosophy, was a nasty racist. Don't believe me? Read this awful footnote. I used to think that one could accept much of Hume's moral and political philosophy without the racism. But Hume's account of the rule of law as being constitutive of 'civilization' also encourages the violent exportation of it as is illustrated by his rather favorable account of English conquest of Wales (essentially a tale of cultural genocide) and Ireland (see this article). With law-governed civilization (as opposed to barbarism) as a necessary prerequisite for (and co-development with) philosophy, Hume's approach facilitates, despite the significance of the moral virtue humanity in his project, empire and patterns of systematic cultural exclusion.* Despite vigorous eighteenth-century criticism of Hume (in Smith, Herder, Wollstonecraft, Millar, etc.), it is undeniable that these ideas survived in mitigated form, perhaps, in the works of some of the greatest philosophers, Kant, Hegel, and even Mill.
So, individual philosophers can have both (a) pernicious philosophical beliefs as well as (b) very dangerous meta-philosophical conceptions of their own enterprise. This is no surprise ever since Socrates was put on trial, fairly or not, for corrupting the young and for having too many high profile students caught up in collaboration and dictatorship as Aeschines emphasized. (I.F. Stone wrote an important book on it that for all its flaws deserves more respect among philosophers.) This is why I tend to talk about these issues in terms of the enduring Socratic Problem for philosophy, and experts more generally. But it is worth noting that (a-b) are compatible with (c) being a nice (or not) professional colleague, and (d) exhibiting moral courage (or not) under duress.
There is no doubt that Heidegger was a terrible colleague, had pernicious individual beliefs, as well as very dangerous meta-philosophical conception of his own enterprise. My teachers and friends (and a few opponents) within analytical philosophy often enjoy pointing this out (see Brian Leiter's legitimate skewering of a dumb defense of Heidegger). The Carnap-Heidegger debate is really also moral in character and both sides understood it as such (recall this post drawing on Abraham Stone). It is perfectly legitimate to evaluate the character of a philosophical sensibility and system for its social consequences.
But it doesn't follow that all so-called 'continental' philosophers and all continental philosophy has been infected by all of Heidegger's sins nor does it follow that we 'analytical' philosophers deserve the high ground we put ourselves on. Several leading continental philosophers showed courage in resisting the Nazis and others were victims. Since WWII much effort has gone into developing continental philosophy in a direction that can do justice to our responsibility for others (e.g., Levinas). Whatever one might think of Derrida, there is no doubt that he, more than nearly all other enduring philosophers has developed a metaphilosophical conception that can resist philosophy's complicity in domination and exclusion--the ongoing ridiculing of his thought among professional philosophers is, thus, a terrifying condemnation of the thoughtlessness of much of what passes as 'philosophy.'**
That Frege-our-Father was an antisemite is well known (but it is amazing that Wikipedia is far more informative than the authoritative SEP entry). His reactionary politics is not intrinsic to scientific philosophy and logic. But it is by no means obvious how one can develop a metaphilosophical conception that is proper to scientific philosophy that does not open the door to political abuses. The topic and value neutrality of formal approaches and their technocratic self-conception leave these relying on the esprit des corps of practitioners to prevent abuses. This is too flimsy a shield, and we should not be surprised by past and future abuses (recall).
Even if there is more nobility to be found in the metaphilosophical conceptions than I have allowed thus far among my peers in professional philosophy, there is no doubt that our teachers and those of us that are now distinguished and eminent in the field have participated in a practice that has allowed systematic patterns of exclusion and worse to cohabit in our midst (notice, that is compatible with many of them being nice colleagues and generous supervisors to those of us that have succeeded them). One reason why I have been fascinated by the critical responses to Peter Singer's work from the mathematical-economist, MA Khan (born in North Waziristan), is Khan's sensitivity to not just Singer's pseudo-economics, but also the cultural imperialism of Singer's enterprise (recall) that happily appeals to powerful international institutions and countries to help implement his ideas.
A few weeks ago, I called attention to Samir Chopra's call (in light of the black absense in academia)*** that "what is perhaps needed is a deeper and more fundamental change, a reconceptualization of the nature of philosophical inquiry and practice." That we must do so while rebuilding our ship in ordinary professional sense (hiring, curriculum), and while remaining engaged in first-order enterprises, makes this no less urgent. For without a metaphilosophical conception that prevents the facilitation of philosophical thought in the politics of domination, hierarchy, and exclusion, we may well do better than Heidegger, but little better than, say, Frege or Hume. That's not good enough.
*I thank Justin Smith for discussion on facebook in light of my response to Nathaniel Coleman's piece. To be clear: Hume advocates peace among civilized nations, and -- on the whole -- he is no friend of cruelty and injustice toward the powerless.
**That is to say, what is problematic in Derrida's thought (and there are, of course, plenty of problems), may well be the price of what is most noble in it.
***Problematic ethnic and gendered patterns of exclusion along color lines within professional exist in countries that do not conform to Anglophone cultural templates.
This might just be tangential, but I find discussions of Heidegger's political views from a non French perspective somehow odd. Heidegger's philosophy has been central to much of French philosophy since the 1930s, including for heavily critical philosophers such as Lévinas, and that includes a lot of philosophers with an openly left-wing agenda, e.g. Derrida, since you mention him, and it is through this agenda that they had first an audience in the Humanities in the US, so that they are now gaining some credibility (with which I have no qualms) in philosophy departments. When you call for a metaphilosophical conception of philosophy that does not facilitate a politics of domination, hierarchy, and exclusion, then you speak of the reasons why philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida are considered so important by many in the Humanities and philosophy. My point is that I find it odd, to say the least, that at the heart of this way of thinking one finds an antisemite and nazi. Heidegger's views are close to playing the role of absolute presuppositions here and this is why people get upset when they are called into doubt or even if one uses the fact that he was a antisemite/nazi to try and point to a difficulty. (I spare you here more on Althusser defending Stalin, Foucault Iran, etc., i.e., a bunch of supposed to be mere mishaps that show rather that these guys were simply ill-equipped to make intelligent political judgements.) One is then tempted to adopt their stance towards other metaphilosophical conceptions including the delirious one that analytic philosophy (which is confusion in France with philosophy in the "English language") is subservient to capitalism, American imperialism, etc. (There are many instances of this but a good starter, albeit from a "second couteau" is Dominique Lecourt's L'ordre et le jeu, but my point is that one does not need to know that stuff to pick on this prejudice). I think you are close to doing that yourself (your move seems to be to reduce, via Frege's antisemitism and a link with Hume the formal approach to "empire and patterns of systematic cultural exclusion"). But you ask "how one can develop a metaphilosophical conception that is proper to scientific philosophy that does not open the door to political abuses" : to my mind, it would be interesting in this vein of inquiry to focus on what may be called "cognitive virtues" or "values", e.g., that one should not contradict oneself, a robust notion of truth, one should write clearly, base one's conclsuion on evidence, etc. One may argue that these are needed for any attempt at avoiding "domination, hierarchy, and exclusion", but as it it turns out, the philosophers we are talking about simply sought to undermine these (Heidegger and Derrida both openly doubted the principle of non-contradiction, all the Nietzschean stuff on truth peddled by Foucault, etc.). One the other hand, these were fostered by the likes of Russell, Carnap, and recently Chomsky (Bouveresse once told me that in reply to his comment about the politics of Chomsky, Deleuze said : "Maybe but his science is right-wing" ; this speaks volumes to me). I'm just dropping the thought here, obviously the comment boxes are a bit small for this topic, both sensitive and fundamental, but my take is that this would be one way to try and reach a satisfactory metaphilosophical conception. Just my onw little take on these issues!
Posted by: Mathieu Marion | 03/25/2014 at 11:56 AM
Mathieu, you beg the question on the value of a robust notion of truth. (And, in fact, there is quite a bit of literature on expert-overconfidence. Maybe you should read up a bit?)
To treat Bouveresse as a useful guide to Deleuze is about as informative as treating Searle as a guide to Foucault (or Derrida)--if this is what you have in mind when you speak of "basing conclusion on evidence," I pass.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/26/2014 at 09:15 AM
ERic, there is a limit to what one can say a comment box, my views (on truth in particular) stand as they are. As for Bouveresse, he was reporting a conversation. Calling his personal integrity in question is not the best line of argument.
Posted by: Mathieu Marion | 03/26/2014 at 09:33 AM
I am not calling anybody's personal integrity into question; just suggesting that such (often interested) reports are not very good at conveying context and insight. And seriously, we should not treat Bouveresse as a guide to Deleuze's thought.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/26/2014 at 09:57 AM
Very interesting post, Eric. As Jared Diamond has observed, there was a period of time during which European technology made astounding leaps forward. At the height of that period, Europeans were inclined to think of themselves as superior to all others. Diamond works hard to show how this was, to an extent, fortuitous. But putting this issue aside, I wonder how much Hume's attitude to black and brown people was just an exemplification of European triumphalism, and different in kind from the vicious social exploitation of black people in 20 and 21c USA. (Of course, there is evidence against this in the footnote you link to, which seems to condone slavery.)
Posted by: Mohan Matthen | 03/26/2014 at 02:30 PM
"I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men…to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation.... Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity…. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but ‘tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly."
--David Hume, “Of National Characters”
This is not "just an exemplification of European triumphalism." Hume's type of "attitude" was part and parcel of and not "different in kind from the vicious social exploitation of black people" in Europe and the U.S. (unless by "different in kind" is simply meant not exploitative in and of itself, which of course no mere attitude could be).
Posted by: LK McPherson | 03/27/2014 at 12:26 AM
Lionel, I am not sure I understand fully what distinction Mohan was trying to make. But it's worth noting (a) that Hume was an enemy of slavery. So, he did not condone all the forms of "vicious social exploitation of black people." I also think it is important (b) to be aware of the fact that there were also philosophers that rejected Hume's kind of racism--so, Hume's position is, 'part and parcel,' but not uncontroversial during the eighteenth century.
Posted by: Eric Schliesser | 03/27/2014 at 12:55 AM
Eric, my comment did not imply, and I do not think, that Hume condoned "all the forms" of vicious exploitation of blacks. Given the variety of vicious forms of exploitation there were and could be, condoning "all" of them would be strange and virtually absurd. Also, I'm well aware that some 18th-century philosophers rejected Hume's type of racism. I'm not sure why my comment prompted you to make that point. Maybe I'm not fully understanding what's going on here.
Posted by: LK McPherson | 03/27/2014 at 03:39 AM