Digressions&Impressions

On the emergence of philosophy of science

What I (try to) do, however, is not philosophy of science. I suppose what I do amounts to old-fashioned Oxford-style conceptual analysis, though again with a new historical emphasis. I should note that I think the word ‘analysis’ in this context is often given much too restrictive a sense (to analyze the concept F is to give necessary and sufficient conditions of the form ‘x is an F if and only if…’ – well, no). In fact I suspect that what I do amounts to the kind of thing that, according to Schliesser, philosophy of science since the time of Newton’s exegetes was deliberately conceived in order to rule out as invalid. On his story, philosophy of science emerged as the exclusive authority of empirical science was invoked by figures like Maclaurin, ‘s Gravesande, Musschenbroek, and Nieuwentyt against the notion that mere reflection on the meanings of concepts can reveal substantive truths about concrete reality.--Alex Douglas, responding, in part, to my post.

Alex's post (welcome to the blogosphere, Alex!) allows me to clarify something about my own position about the emergence of philosophy of science. By 'philosophy of science,' I mean a distinct, second order reflection on scientific practice and images of science (on images of science recall this).* Douglas is right to associate my story with now-obscure figures like Maclaurin, ‘s Gravesande, Musschenbroek, and Nieuwentyt. What these eighteenth century characters have in common is that they were willing to appeal to the authority of Newtonian natural philosophy to settle debate within philosophy/metaphysics proper. (I call such a move "Newton's Challenge!") Maclaurin, ‘s Gravesande, and Musschenbroek also made some contributions to Newtonian natural philosophy, but on the whole they are worth remembering (together with Nieuwentyt) for their reflections on the nature of Newton's achievement. To be clear: none of these four characters were slavish followers of Newton; they recast Newton's position in terms that served their own philosophical ends often in polemical context (often, but not exclusively, anti-Spinozistic). But on my account, their arguments did not go unchallenged. In particular, Diderot, Hume, Buffon, Mandeville (etc.) all offer arguments and considerations that are, in part, a response to "Newton's Challenge" as such and, in some part, directly addressing the detailed arguments offered in its favor. By my lights these arguments by Diderot, Hume, Buffon, Berkeley, Mandeville also contribute to the emergence of philosophy of science as a distinct, second order enterprise. So, the authority of science was debated in the emergence of philosophy science (see here, in part). As an aside, this was, in part, a debate within what is now  known as 'empiricism.'

An Image of Science Against Spinozism

Everybody, who understands the reasonings of both [mathematicians and philosophers] knows that the mathematicians, who following the rules of her science, have found many truths and have suffered fewer disputes about this than any other philosophers, who have followed a different path. No atheist [not even a follower of Spinoza--ES] can contradict this with the appearance of truth; in order to pass off his lamentable feelings for truths, Spinoza adopted the proof methods of geometry or mathemathematics in his Ethics in order to persuade the inexperienced with such superficial appearance.—Nieuwentyt (1720) Gronden van zekerheid,

Philosophy of science, as a distinct intellectual topic within philosophy, is parasitic on the existence of science. Science-like activity co-originates and coincides with the origins of Western philosophy in its mythological origins (think Thales). So, it stands to reason that there was some philosophy of science from the start; indeed we can discern in Plato and in Aristotle topics that we might label (even anachronistically) 'philosophy of science.' Throughout recorded history we find practitioners of the science that also engage in philosophical reflection on their own (and others') practice, or that articulate various epistemic and normative ideals, say, for the nature of scientific knowledge.

But if we understand 'philosophy of science' as a distinct, second-order intellectual enterprise that reflects on the nature, methods, presuppositions and aims (etc.) of science, then we're dealing with a relatively recent invention. I used to think, in fact, that it could only exist as a consequence of the institutional and methodological split(s) between philosophy and science. This split is commonly thought to be a nineteenth century  event, although various disciplines become differentiated from philosophy at different times in different  places in various institutions of higher learning.*

Some philosophy of science preceded the split between philosophy and science and, in fact, made it possible. To the best of my knowledge Bernard Nieuwentijt's posthumously published (1720) Gronden van zekerheid, of de regte betoogwyse der wiskundigen ...: ter wederlegging van Spinosaas denkbeeldig samenstel; : en ter aanleiding van eene sekere sakelyke wysbegeerte (that is the, "Grounds of Centainty; or the straight way of mathematical argumentation put together in order to refute Spinoza’s imagery combinations; and to promote a secure factual philosophy") is the first, distinct book of philosophy of science. As is clear from the title, it's written as a refutation of Spinoza. In particular, it's designed to show that despite the geometric method, Spinoza's work should not be conflated with, and receive the intellectual prestige of, the emerging mathematical sciences exemplified by Huygens and, especially, Newton throughout  the book.