It is also true, as the Austrian economist Menger has remarked, that sciences have been created and revolutionized by those who have not stopped to analyse their own method of enquiry.--J.N. Keynes (1891) The Scope and Method of Political Economy, p. 5.
I was reminded of Keynes's treatment of Menger while listening to a lovely paper by the young scholar, Jens van 't Klooster, at a recent HOPOS conference. J.N. Keynes -- an author of a logic text-book -- is the father of the more famous philosopher-economist, Keynes. Menger is often associated with the idea of a scientific revolution because together with Jevons and Walras, Menger is taken to have revolutionized formal economic theory by introducing marginal analysis. Keynes reports that Menger was familiar enough with the concept of a scientific revolution. In fact, in the remark attributed to Menger, Menger recognizes both the establishment of sciences and their (intermittent) revolutions.
As an aside, we should not assume ideas about revolutions are original with Menger. Menger was a close student of Adam Smith's "History of Astronomy," (here) which offers a historical narrative about successive revolutions among (psychologically) incommensurable systems of thought in the sciences, which have regular patterns of development between each revolution (recall).
Despite early mention of the idea of revolution in science, Keynes does not elaborate at first. But it's clear that Keynes thinks of economics as a less mature science than, say, "physics and astronomy," (or less "definitive"). For Keynes relies on the idea that an a science develops through different stages, including a "descriptive or classificatory" stage before reaching an ultimate (or "definitive"), "deductive" stage. (These stages, themselves, are not to be confused with the three step/stage deductive method that Keynes adopts from J.S. Mill.) In fact, within this progressive framework of stages, Keynes inscribes a now familiar ideal:
If political economy regarded from the theoretical standpoint is to make good progress, it is essential that all extrinsic or premature sources of controversy should be eliminated; and we may be sure that the more its principles are discussed independently of ethical and practical considerations, the sooner will the science emerge from its controversial stage. The intrusion of ethics into economics cannot but multiply and perpetuate sources of disagreement. (Ch.2)