There is a kind of low-level gripe one hears among so-called 'contextual' historians of philosophy that have found a home in professional philosophy departments. These 'contextualists' are often trained in HPS programs or are inspired by the so-called Cambridge school of intellectual history associated with names such as Quentin Skinner and John Pocock (neither at Cambridge now). The gripe goes something like this: professional philosophers that do history of philosophy are not really doing history as historians understand this.* Now, there is a sense in which the gripe is trivially true: whenever professional philosophers produce 'history of philosophy' -- and this has astonishing diversity in methods and products -- it is almost never intended to meet the standards of professional historians; if they are not writing for each other, such historians of philosophy in philosophy departments write for fellow philosophers. But the gripe is also based on some very dubious commitments. I offer five considerations to substantiate the claim in the previous sentence.